










The Biometric Imaginary:  
Standardization & Objectivity in the Post-Apartheid Welfare State
Kevin P. Donovan | DNVKEV001 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of 
the degree of MSocSc in Sociology 
Faculty of the Humanities 
University of Cape Town 
2013 
COMPULSORY DECLARATION
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It 
is my own work.  Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the 
work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 









wnThe copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be
published without full acknowledgement of the source.
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only.
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms













Table	  of	  Contents	  
Abstract	  .....................................................................................................................	  3	  
I.	  Introduction	  ..........................................................................................................	  4	  
II. An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Politics	  &	  History	  of	  Biometric	  Identification	  &
Welfare	  ....................................................................................................................	  10	  
Biometric	  State	  Identification	  ..........................................................................................................................	  10	  
Biometric	  Identification	  in	  South	  African	  History	  .................................................................................	  13	  
The	  Politics	  of	  Welfare	  in	  South	  Africa	  .......................................................................................................	  15	  
III.	  The	  Will	  to	  Standardize:	  Discourse	  and	  Institutional	  Reform	  .................	  21	  
Introduction	  .............................................................................................................................................................	  21	  
Chikane	  Committee	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  23	  
The Investigation into the Delivery of Social Security Services ....................................................... 25
Standardization through Institutional Centralization ......................................................................... 27
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................. 29
IV.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Objectivity:	  The	  Growth	  of	  Quantitative	  Evidence	  in	  
Welfare	  Policymaking ...........................................................................................31
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 31
Newfound Facts ...................................................................................................................................................... 32
Quantification	  as	  Defense	  ..................................................................................................................................	  34	  
Quantification as Advocacy............................................................................................................................... 35
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................. 37
V.	  Standardization	  &	  Objectivity	  in	  the	  Adoption	  of	  Biometric	  Social	  Grant	  
Identification .........................................................................................................39
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 39
Bedeviling Discretion: Fraud, Corruption	  & Bureaucratic Weakness ........................................... 40
South African Biometric	  Welfare.................................................................................................................... 44
Conclusion................................................................................................................................................................. 51
VI.	  The	  Myth	  of	  Perfection	  &	  the	  Ambiguities	  of	  Delegation..........................53
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 53
The	  Myth	  of	  Perfection	  ........................................................................................................................................	  53	  
Delegation,	  Standardization,	  and	  the	  State-­‐Citizen	  Relationship	  ..................................................	  59	  
Conclusion	  .................................................................................................................................................................	  65	  
VII.	  Conclusion	  .......................................................................................................	  67	  












Starting in March 2012, the South African government engaged in a massive effort of 
citizen registration that continued for more than a year. Twenty-one million social 
welfare beneficiaries enrolled in a novel biometric identification scheme that uses 
fingerprints and voice recognition to authenticate social grant recipients. This dissertation 
seeks to understand the meaning of biometric identification in post-apartheid South 
African welfare through a study of the bureaucratic and policy elite’s motivation for this 
undertaking. It suggests that biometric technology was conceived of and implemented as 
the most recent in a series of institutional, policymaking, and infrastructural reforms that
seek to deliver welfare in a standardized and objective manner.  
At the time of the political transition, South Africa’s bureaucracy was fragmented 
with uneven capacity. I trace the broader emergence of a will to standardize and a pursuit
of objectivity, animating commitments that influence the adoption of biometric 
technology. I suggest that the adoption of a nationally centralized biometric welfare
database has been the result of ‘the biometric imaginary’, a belief that biometric 
technology is a necessary, suitable, and effective means of enacting a uniform and 
impartial welfare state. Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this new 
system, the transformations in welfare administration more broadly have largely been a 
success. It would be, however, a mistake to assume they are an unalloyed good, without
trade-offs. Their most recent result – the new biometric payment system – serves to 
highlight some of those shortcomings, including often ignored technical failures and a 












Beginning in March 2012 and continuing for a little more than a year, 21 million 
predominantly low-income South African residents queued at government facilities to be 
photographed and submit their personal details, including a full set of fingerprints and a 
voice recording. From rural towns to major cities, old and young alike were required to 
present themselves for this massive registration drive. States make records of their citizens 
for various reasons, and depending on the age of those queued, chances were they had 
been similarly registered in the past, perhaps for racial labor control during apartheid, 
perhaps for South Africa’s democratic election in 1994.  
 The episode in question, though, was the result of a bureaucratic decision by 
welfare policymakers to implement a new administrative infrastructure for South Africa’s 
extensive program of social grants. Designated primarily for the elderly, poor caregivers, 
and the disabled, these monthly government-to-citizen transfers are perhaps the most 
significant means of poverty alleviation in contemporary South Africa. Those 21 million 
residents – around 40 percent of the country’s entire population – provided their personal 
details in order to receive their grants through a new payment system. For the recipients, 
the new system offered increased convenience through the provision of a payment card 
accepted at a large cash distribution network throughout the country. For the 
government, the system promised a reliable means of delivering millions of rand per 
month. As the Minister of Social Development Bathabile Dlamini (2013) would explain, 
the goal was “to improve the integrity of our social security system, and to eliminate all 
forms of fraud and corruption.” Prominent civil society organizations like the Black Sash, 
too, “welcomed [the] move to a biometric system” (Nyembezi 2012). 
 The cornerstone of this new system is biometric identification, the use of 
technologies to recognize specific bodily features. Most important is the use of fingerprint 
scanners, but the system also aims to use voice recognition software for when 
fingerprinting is infeasible and only a phone call can occur. This is not the first time 
biometric identification has been used widely in South Africa. Both before and during 
apartheid, government officials have been enamored of the potential for using analog 











In the post-apartheid era, digital biometric technology has been central to the 
identification programs of the Department of Home Affairs, as well as used extensively in 
previous welfare systems.  
Yet rarely have these systems functioned as promised, whether for good or ill. 
Without ignoring the very real human cost of authoritarianism, Evans (1997: 99) suggests 
that “the collective impact of recent scholarship on the labor bureau system has steadily 
destroyed the structure’s reputation for omnipotence and doctrinaire imperiousness.” 
Breckenridge (2005a) suggests the biometric obsession even undermined the apartheid 
state’s ability to act. In the post-apartheid era, too, despite significant investment, large-
scale biometric identification schemes have stalled or proven ineffective (Breckenridge
2008).  
Therefore, the continuing salience of biometric identification amongst the
bureaucratic and policy elite seems curious. This dissertation seeks to explore the
meaning of biometric identification within post-aparth id South Africa through an 
investigation of the way in which it is conceptualized and the reasons for which it is 
adopted by policymakers and members of government, especially those within the welfare
administration. 
*** 
Historians have suggested that states and societies tend to cohere particular systems for 
registering and identifying individuals. “Viewed globally,” write Szreter and Breckenridge
(2012: 3), “societies, and the individuals within them, seem to be very variably shaped by 
what we might call cultures of registration”. Similarly, Caplan (2001: 51) suggests that a 
“culture of identification” – “essentially unruly” but comparatively distinct – can be said 
to exist in a given society. These cultures are the historically contingent results of evolving 
politics, economics, technology, and more. Their distinctions help to enact novel relations 
between government and citizen, yet as Strathern (2000) notes in her discussion of the
related notion of “audit cultures” they are “always in the making”. 
In the chapters that follow, I aim to explicate some of the dynamics behind a post-
apartheid culture of registration and identification. I argue that a relatively stable and 
collective understanding exists among the bureaucratic and policy elite about how to 











understanding – that I propose to call ‘the biometric imaginary’ – posits biometric 
technology as a necessary, suitable, and effective means of enacting a standardized and 
objective welfare state. Following the gestures to culture mention by the scholars above, I 
seek to provide an interpretive account, concerned with understanding the richness and 
ambiguity of the experiences rather than a linear, causal narrative. As Rabinow and 
Sullivan (1979: 6) note, “Culture, the shared meanings, practices, and symbols that
constitute the human world, does not present itself neutrally or with one voice.” As such, 
my account is focused (and thus limited) in three meaningful ways. Temporally, it is 
primarily confined to the post-apartheid period and does not discuss the important
transformations in the culture of identification and registration symbolized by 1994. 
Secondly, its scope is particularly focused on the social grants program, rather than, say, 
national security (where surveillance has recently become controversial through the so-
called ‘Secrecy Bill’). While I suspect the analysis applies more broadly, recent popular 
resistance to biometric technology in schools (e.g. Mawson 2013) suggests important
differences from the welfare experience, where little opposition exists. And, finally, I have
considered primarily bureaucratic and policy elites, especially government but also civil 
society and academia; insofar as the shared significance of biometric identification within 
that community is distinct from the beneficiaries, this work excludes what might be called 
the popular culture of grant identification.   
For many individuals involved in post-apartheid welfare policy reform and 
implementation, the manner in which biometric identification is conceived and 
implemented is driven by two interlinked commitments of the era: a will to standardize
and a pursuit of objectivity. The emphasis on standardization has arisen as a means of 
uniting and improving the fragmented and weak bureaucracy inherited from the
apartheid regime. South Africa has endeavored to create equality of citizenship through 
enacting uniformity. This has included bureaucratic centralization (first through the
establishment of a unitary, national Department of Social Development (DSD) in 1994, 
and after through the creation of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) in 
2005) as well as technological reform (such as through the linking of various databases 











In parallel, an egalitarian ethos has militated against subjectivity, in favor of rule-
bound – and thus objective – practices. As De Tocqueville and Weber elaborated long 
ago, in a democratic setting, subjective discretion is viewed with suspicion. In post-
apartheid social protection, two forms of discretion have proven particularly troubling: 
illicit access to grants and bureaucratic error. The preference for objectivity has affected 
the types of knowledge deemed legitimate for policymaking, with quantified evidence 
growing significantly. It has also deeply influenced the delivery of social grants, with 
biometric identification offering an impersonal and presumptively neutral means of grant 
administration.  
Both standardization and objectivity are widespread and productive commitments 
that shape the understanding of biometric registration and identification. The particular 
confluence of the will to standardize, the pursuit of objectivity, and the use of social grants 
have given rise to the belief that biometric identification is necessary, suitable, and 
effective. As in Appadurai’s (1996: 31) discussions of social imaginaries, the biometric 
imaginary is “a constructed landscape of collective aspirations” that serves as a “staging 
ground for action”. These imaginaries are productive social forces with real-world 
implications, but they do not always accurately correspond to reality, exhibiting varying 
degrees of interpretive flexibility. As I will contend, the dominant understanding of 
biometrics as necessary, suitable, and effective are each, in part, fantasy and reality.
However, the biometric imaginary is not merely relevant at the level of ideas. 
Drawing on Hecht’s (2009 [1998]) notion of technopolitics – and the insights of science
and technology studies (STS) more broadly – I emphasize the materiality of South 
Africa’s social grants initiative. As Jasanoff (2004) argues, society and technology co-
produce, with both elements capable of (surprising) influence on the other. Technopolitics 
is the “strategic practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact
political goals” (Hecht 2009 [1998]: 15). The term serves to remind us that “technologies 
cannot be reduced to politics… [and that] the effectiveness of these technologies as 
objects designed to accomplish real material purposes… matters.” Biometric grant
schemes are material means of enabling the poor to purchase more than they could 
otherwise; as such, they resemble what Callon et al. (2007) call “market devices”, 











also MacKenzie 2009). But perhaps more importantly, they are what might be called 
‘citizenship devices,’ the material enablers of constitutional rights, in this case the right to 
social security. For many South Africans, the grant is the most obvious way in which the 
state appears in their lives, and it is a relationship mediated by biometric technology.  
The chapters that follow will show how the will to standardize and the pursuit of 
objectivity have driven a series of technopolitical programs within the post-apartheid 
welfare sector. Chapter two serves to introduce briefly three issues: the global diversity of 
state identification practices, the tumultuous South African history of identification, and 
the contemporary political contests about the social grants program.  
Chapter three turns specifically to standardization, analyzing the emergence of an 
influential elite discourse. This framing points to a ‘crisis’ in grant delivery, caused by a 
fragmented bureaucracy and exhibited by the prevalence of fraud, corruption, and 
failures in delivery. The government reports, Parliamentary hearings, and media 
discussion that promulgated this discourse offered standardization – of institutions, 
infrastructures, and policies – as the solution to the crisis. As a result, the post-apartheid 
welfare elite have been consumed with a will to standardize the fractured and 
incompatible processes, institutions, and infrastructures.   
Chapter four illustrates the broader importance of objectivity through a discussion 
of the rise of quantified evidence in welfare policymaking. The pursuit of objectivity is an 
ethos and program of reducing discretion in favor of rule-bound, even mechanical, 
processes, including those of statistical analysis. As apartheid came to a close, academic 
and government surveys began to generate previously missing baseline statistical data 
about the extent of poverty and the state of service delivery. In the years since, academics, 
civil society, and government stakeholders have resorted to quantification, with numerical 
evidence becoming an important means of testimony and advocacy. 
Chapter five directly confronts the use of biometric identification in South African 
social grants, illustrating the forms of inconsistency and discretion that have bedeviled the 
social grants program, particularly unequal quality of service delivery, improper 
bureaucratic behavior, and illicit access to grants through fraud and corruption. In the 
realm of grant delivery, biometric identification has been conceived and implemented as 











the new system instituted in 2012-2013, about which SASSA declared the intention “is to 
have all the Beneficiaries, irrespective of the method through which they receive their 
Grants, to be Biometrically identified [sic]” (SASSA 2011). 
The final substantive chapter adopts a more reflective tone, critically assessing the 
weaknesses and shortcomings in the biometric imaginary. As a means of accurately 
identifying individuals, biometric technology often falls short, failing in persistent manners 
that undermine claims to equal treatment; however, biometric identification can be a 
productive failure, securing profits, deterring fraud, and demonstrating seriousness even if 
the technology is oversold. Finally, I discuss the consensus around biometric identification 
and the ways in which it assists in the creation of a centralized, national welfare program 
that comes with subtle trade-offs. In particular it has created a structure that may distance 
the citizen from the state, even while being the most prominent form of state-assistance to 
citizens in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 It is too soon to tell if the new biometric registration and payment system will 
prove to be another troubled use of the technology by the South African state; however 
the emulation of both South Africa’s system of social grants (Hanlon et al. 2010) and 
biometric methodologies (Gelb and Clark 2011) suggests the need for an understanding of 











II.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Politics	  &	  History	  of	  Biometric	  
Identification	  &	  Welfare	  
 
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this chapter is to introduce in three sections the 
broad historical and political context of inquiry. The first provides an 
overview of biometric state identification, emphasizing the divergent 
political drivers and palatability of biometric identification across the 
globe; while in some cases it is considered relatively innocuous, in others it 
evokes significant controversy and opposition. Secondly, I present a brief 
history of biometric state identification in South Africa that not only serves 
to demonstrate the technology’s “momentum” (Hughes 1994) but also the 
novelty of today’s lack of resistance to biometrics. Finally, I outline the 
contested politics of welfare in post-apartheid South Africa, a series of 
struggles over the proper redistributive role of the state that have deeply 
influenced the use of biometric identification for grant recipients. 
Biometric	  State	  Identification	  
Identity documents have historically been key means of materially fixing “the state-society 
boundary”, a frontier that Mitchell (2006: 170) and others have shown to be fluid. 
Various theorists link the creation of identity infrastructures closely to the bundle of 
transformations that constitute ‘modernity’, however understood (Foucault 1975; Giddens 
1990; Bauman 2004; Lyon 2009), but it has also occurred in places and times not usually 
considered ‘modern’, such as imperial China (von Glahn 2012). Indeed, registration and 
identification has unfolded globally with divergent results and using disparate means.  
The tasks for which registration and identification have been enrolled vary from 
conscription and taxation to education and welfare. The coercive nature of state-based 
identification has often received the most scholarly attention, with influential theoretical 
contributions from Weber, Foucault, and, more recently, Scott (1999). However, as Setel 
et al. (2007) and Szreter and Breckenridge (2012) recently argue, the act of identification 
often implies beneficial, even life-saving, results, through the provision and protection of 
rights.  
These debates about effects are intertwined with the methods through which 
individuals are initially registered and subsequently identified. Not all methods of 
identification imply equal effects. To pick an obvious example, the historical practice of 











documents, and an identity card noting ethnicity shapes the practice of identification in a 
way that one without ethnicity does not (for this diversity, see the contributions to Caplan 
and Torpey 2001).  
The growth of biometric identification, therefore, implies certain biases and 
affordances that will unfold in relation to particular contexts. In its contemporary sense, 
biometric identification is typically understood as the use of bodily characteristics for 
recognition. It has traditionally been done manually, but is increasingly conducted 
digitally, through the algorithmic matching of precisely measured features. While the 
geography of fingerprints is the most common method, today it is possible (with varying 
degrees of accuracy) to use many other bodily features for identification purposes.  
Fingerprints are appealing identifying features because no two humans have ever been 
shown to have the same pattern and they are easily retrievable (unlike, say, DNA).  
However, the actual act of matching fingerprints is far more difficult than that 
may imply, and can therefore easily be mistaken (Cole 2006). To begin, a meaningful 
portion of the population is unable to be recognized by biometric technology, for reasons 
such as missing or damaged fingers. The act of registering biometric features is often error 
prone, leading to databases that include poor samples. Furthermore, the humans or 
algorithms tasked with comparing biometric samples are imperfect. As the National 
Academies of Science concluded, “biometric recognition is an inherently probabilistic 
endeavour” where complexity and uncertainty undermine sought-after certitude (Pato 
and Millett 2010: viii).   
In recent years, biometric identification has been used in a variety of fields, 
ranging from policing and border control to welfare and voting. Gelb and Clark (2013) 
estimate more than one billion people have been biometrically registered around the 
world. In a growing number of cases, governments have adopted biometric identification 
as the standard for national identification systems. As of December 2007, Lyon and 
Bennett (2008: 6-8) estimate that 43 countries have a national biometric identification 
program; these range from Argentina’s mandatory system that captures just the right 
thumbprint to Mexico’s voluntary system of fingerprinting. A number of countries have 











fingerprinting from their identity cards. In others – such as the UK, Australia, Japan, and 
France – biometric identification systems have been defeated by vociferous opposition.  
As Martin et al. (2009) detail, the resistance arises from numerous sources, beyond 
simply those to be biometrically identified, including commercial entities, trade unions, 
civil society, international actors, and even artists (see also Marx 2003).  The reasons for 
resisting biometric identification have been manifold (see Pato and Millett 2010). Some 
technologists are quick to point out the fallibility of the systems (including high rates of 
failures to enroll people or accurately match within the database). Others worry about the 
expansion of government surveillance and the reduction of individual autonomy. This is 
often compounded by uncertainty about the security or secondary uses of data collected 
for a specific purpose. The notion of consent is often troubled, with populations least able 
to find alternatives being typical subjects of biometric identification (e.g. prisoners, welfare 
recipients, and refugees). This leads to worries about discrimination, both in what types of 
people do or do not get included in biometric databases, as well as the suspicion of those 
excluded. Finally, the costs of biometric identification have often been too high to justify 
their benefits.  Resistance to biometric identification is particularly motivated by the 
concern that biometrics exacerbate the risks due to their uniqueness: by capturing 
immutable, life-long characteristics like fingerprints, the surveillance infrastructure is 
considerably more durable, raising questions about the ability to contain security 
breaches or data creep (see also Ball 2005; Martin and Whitley 2013).  
Biometric identification is a component of a larger administrative and 
technological regime that raises complex questions about social and political relations. As 
such, biometric identification has been met with varying levels of support and resistance. 
Bennett and Lyon (2008: 10-17) identify a variety of factors influencing the common 
drivers and social acceptability of such schemes. At a basic level, the availability of 
technical expertise (either domestic or imported) is essential. Certain policy issues (notably 
national security or immigration concerns, but also social welfare schemes) tend to drive 
government adoption of biometric identification. The authors also suggest that aspects of 
a political culture (such as higher levels of trust in the state) and historical legacies (such as 
familiarity with identification technology or collective memory of trauma) have been 











structure will influence how registration and identification are “defined, debated, and 
resolved”, with strong, centralized states – as well as those “permeable to private sector 
influence” – perhaps proving more amenable to more significant identification regimes.  
As explained in the subsequent chapters, these factors have, to varying degrees, 
influenced the centrality of biometric identification within post-apartheid South African 
social security. However, before turning to those specifics, this chapter next introduces the 
South African history of state registration before turning to the post-apartheid politics of 
welfare.  
Biometric	  Identification	  in	  South	  African	  History	  
South Africa’s infamous history of state registration has its roots in the 18th century Cape 
Colony but its structure and intensity has waxed and waned through the decades. Pass 
laws, which varied between provinces and towns, were a means of controlling laborers. 
Commonly, these written records detailed the employer, laborer, and terms of 
employment (most crucially its duration). In practice, these served to tie underpaid 
workers to a particular location, curtailing mobility. With the discovery of minerals in the 
late 19th century, pass laws were revived and extended to prevent black farm workers 
from flocking to the mines. As a method of labor control, passes did not apply to women 
prior to the 1890s, and only unevenly after that (Wells 1993: 4-6).  
 At the start of the 20th century, fingerprinting began to be incorporated in the pass 
systems, most prominently in the case of the Asian population. Mohandas Gandhi, who 
spent more than two decades in South Africa as a lawyer, was a major organizer of 
popular resistance to these early biometric registration schemes (Power 1969; Bhana and 
Vahed 2005). In addition to opposing segregation, part of the resistance from Gandhi and 
other Indians stemmed from the particularities of the biometric plan: the proposed law 
called for capturing ten fingerprints, an act that was seen as degrading and tinged with an 
accusation of criminality. At the time, in the contexts in which Gandhi knew 
fingerprinting, ten fingers were only used to identify criminals. Instead, Gandhi was 
willing to accede, a single thumbprint was all that was needed for legitimate administration 
of the Indian population who, as honest citizens, were willing to be identified. “Gandhi 











print finger registration was unnecessarily degrading and wasteful” (Breckenridge 2011: 
340).  
 The government proponents, though, were able to convince Gandhi that full 
fingerprinting was necessary through a discursive appeal to science: Smuts’s government 
argued that “statistical certainty” required the full fingerprinting effort (Breckenridge 
2011: 340). It was this appeal to the science of classification that eventually swayed 
Gandhi in 1908, and he began exhorting his audience to accept fingerprinting, with “the 
scientific, modernizing character of fingerprinting provid[ing] the core of his new 
advocacy” (343). Ultimately, however, Gandhi was disillusioned in his compact with the 
government, but his resulting last-ditch effort to resist again the biometric scheme failed 
in the face of “a barrage of penalties and punishments” (344) from the state. 
As the industrial sector grew around the time of the First World War and after, so 
too did its political desire for a more fluid labor market. This conflict with the mining and 
agricultural sectors led to years of indeterminacy wh re strict pass laws were less 
effectively enforced. During the Second World War, the pass laws were even 
“experimentally suspended” (Wells 1993: 8), a change that is often attributed to the 
demands of the industrial sector, the reduced internal policing capacity during the war, 
and the fear of African disloyalty at a vulnerable moment. Shear (2013) argues that the 
latter is the most likely, and that the subsequent return to pass laws was the result of the 
National Party’s gradual mobilization of white hostility to black urbanization.   
The lull in pass enforcement changed with the election of the apartheid regime 
that began applying and enforcing pass requirements far more vigorously. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, Hendrik Verwoerd’s system issued to every African adult an identity 
document that served as the everyday manifestation of an enormous, centralized 
bureaucracy that captured personal information (Evans 1997). As Posel (2001) has shown, 
the national population register was the regime’s cornerstone but the repressive 
infrastructure “hinged on the efficacy of the fingerprinting systems” (Breckenridge 2005a: 
86).  
 Then (as now) fingerprinting was chosen because it was felt to be the only reliable 
way of identifying a population that was often illiterate, mobile, and had reason to 











overestimated. Although the passbooks were instrumental in a “dramatic rise in 
prosecutions over the period 1960-68” (Savage 1986), within another decade, it would be 
clear that the system was incapable of reliably monitoring the African population. The 
logic of the passbooks was simply too contradictory: on the one hand, the system had to 
facilitate inclusion of the labor needed by the white population, but it was also used to 
exclude most Africans from everywhere but the “Bantustans that [were] already grossly 
overcrowded and poverty stricken” (Savage 1986: 205). The incentive to subvert the 
system was enormous, overwhelming the centralized bureaucracy (Breckenridge 2005a). 
Even an effort to upgrade the technical means of surveillance proved infeasible (Edwards 
and Hecht 2010; cf. Beniger 1986). By the 1980s, even President P.W. Botha admitted 
that “On the question of influx control, I can only say it is outdated and too costly” 
(quoted in Savage 1986: 182).  
 As the political transition emerged, while a national system of identity documents 
and databases did not disappear, the capricious and violent use of them by the state did. 
With this political change, the incentive for identification changed. For the bureaucratic 
and policy elite, the task of identifying individuals was now directed at a process of 
democratic state-building and, particularly, poverty alleviating redistribution. For the 
citizens, in turn, state registration and identification was less the blunt tool of a coercive 
state and more an instrument of a “caring society” (see Friedman 1999; cf. Sevenhuijsen 
et al. 2003) engaged in a significant redistributive project.1 However, given the 
administrative and technical weaknesses of the database, this process of conversion has 
been anything but straightforward, necessitating significant institutional and technological 
reform (see, respectively, chapters three and five). 
The	  Politics	  of	  Welfare	  in	  South	  Africa	  
The current political context is essential to understanding the role of biometric 
identification in South Africa’s social protection programs. These programs have deep 
roots, with formal welfare beginning in the 1920s as an effort to curtail poverty within the 
white population (Seekings 2007). It expanded in the decades that followed, including to 
the African, Asian, and coloured populations (though service remained best for the white 
                                                
1 It would be a mistake to ignore the elements of identification which remain coercive, including 











population). By the end of apartheid, the pillars of the system were a universal old age 
pension, support for poor parents and the disabled, and a small contributory 
unemployment scheme (Seekings 2002). This inheritance serves as a key component of 
the democratic government’s poverty alleviation strategy, with much of the structure 
continuing today. The most significant programmatic change has been the replacement 
of the State Maintenance Grant with the Child Support Grant in 1998. The CSG was a 
smaller monthly grant of R100 at first, but designed to be much more broadly accessible 
than the SMG whose administrative structure limited its adoption (Lund 2008). The 
grants have grown from about 2 to 3.5 percent of GDP in the first twelve years after 
apartheid, with more than 12 million grants paid monthly in 2007 (Seekings 2008b), a 
figure that today stands closer to 16 million due to continued parametric expansion (e.g. 
expanding the qualifying age for children).  
 The social grants are widely viewed as an effective means of poverty alleviation in 
the post-apartheid era, central to the promises of the democratic era. Despite this growth, 
the politics of welfare in democratic South Africa are, to say the least, complicated. 
Almost every stakeholder - from trade unions and industry to government ministries and 
civil society - find themselves on a knife's edge, negotiating between contradictory and 
evolving positions. As such, there has been nothing given about the expansion of the 
programs in the post-apartheid era; indeed the grants have faced considerable opposition, 
with the value of an individual grant even declining in real terms from 1996 to 2001 
(Seekings and Matisonn 2012).  
 As Everatt (2008: 301) notes, it is difficult to discuss this complexity without 
"broad brush strokes," but he delineates between social grant proponents (usually 
represented by "COSATU and the SACP, the churches, and some elements of civil 
society") and opponents ("including senior government officials, business and much of the 
media [who emphasize] 'the dignity of work'" as the preeminent poverty alleviation 
intervention).  
 Although they are marked by heterogeneity, within these camps the proponents of 











inequality.2 They draw on a discourse of a ‘caring society’ and the protections of the 
Constitution. While it is largely an effort of the left, there is an interesting strand of 
support that emanates from a belief that grants permit an escape from a ‘poverty trap,’ 
allowing the poor to enter the market as entrepreneurial risk-takers (Ferguson 2009).3 
That the substantial expansion of social grant programs was even thinkable owed, in large 
part, to the fact that it was institutionalized long before the 1990s (Seekings 2002). It is the 
joint inheritance of poverty and institutionalized welfare that has positioned South 
African proponents not only to defend welfare in the face of opposition, but to campaign 
actively for its expansion, an exceptional status that is beginning to be noticed more 
broadly as a challenge to the dominant narrative about neoliberalism (e.g. Hilgers 2012; 
Collier 2012; Ferguson 2009; Ferguson 2011).  
 On the other side is a vocal opposition to the scope of the social grants. Although 
they often speak of similar poverty and inequality alleviation imperatives, opponents of 
welfare tend to be prompted by a very different set of commitments, a set of interlinked 
ideologies and discourses that Barchiesi (2011: 94) says are extreme enough to constitute a 
Foucauldian episteme. There are at least three foundational commitments, the first of 
which is the centrality of wage labor. Employment is seen as the pathway out of poverty 
and largely the responsibility of the individual. This informs a belief – echoed in high-
level ANC documents (e.g. ANC 2007) and elsewhere – that social protection or other 
‘government handouts’ create ‘dependency.’ Barchiesi (2011: 98) asserts that, “Virulent 
opposition to welfare “dependency” has become a distinctive characteristic of the ANC 
government.” This discourse extends beyond government, as well, pervading society, 
where rumours and theories about recipients using the money to buy drugs or avoid work 
are prevalent. It is also proposed that grants create perverse incentives, encouraging 
teenage pregnancies and non-treatment of HIV/AIDS (see also Everatt 2008; Meth 
2004). These beliefs are all the more troubling to adherents of this discourse because of 
worries about the affordability of the grants. Post-apartheid South Africa has placed 
                                                
2 In the case of COSATU, whose members stand to gain through the defense of high wages, a 
relaxed need to support poor dependents, and an expansion of state administration, there is also a 
measure of self-interest (Seekings & Matisonn 2003) 
3 This anti-paternalism (that posits that the poor know best how to spend their money) has also 
militated against the type of intrusive and ongoing surveillance that characterizes the American 











considerable emphasis on being viewed positively by global financial markets, and 
profligate spending on welfare would trouble this image. As such, the ANC has offered a 
vision of “developmental social welfare” (RSA 1997) where grants are framed as a path to 
sustained economic activity.  
 These opposing poles have conflicted during the post-apartheid period, with 
policy often being pulled in contradictory directions as a result. The ANC's 1994 election 
manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development Programme, included a commitment to 
"attacking poverty and deprivation" but it was ambivalent on social grants, noting that 
"Although a much stronger welfare system is needed to support all the vulnerable, the 
old, the disabled and the sick who currently live in poverty, a system of "handouts" for the 
unemployed should be avoided" (ANC 1994). The different positions led to a lack of 
clarity in foundational documents. The Constitutional definition of "appropriate social 
assistance" for those unable to support themselves or dependents was vague, as was the 
government's 1997 White Paper for Social Welfare which set out the concept of 
"developmental welfare" which favored of linking welfare to employment, rather than 
'handouts' (RSA 1997).  
 Beginning in the late 1990s, the RDP was supplanted by the conservative 
macroeconomic approach of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy. GEAR was eventually condemned for both its policies and the centralized 
means through which it was designed and implemented. It was closely associated with 
(then vice-president) Thabo Mbeki whose technocratic approach to governance 
consolidated considerable authority in the presidency. The first major social policy 
implemented during this era was the Child Support Grant proposed by the Lund 
Committee in 1996, which was also condemned for limited consultation and not 
challenging the fiscal conservatism of the government (Johnson 2000). 
 In this fin de siècle setting, as promises of democracy were frustratingly slow to 
emerge, the reaction within the social security sector was broad. A variety of civil society 
organizations prominently resisted the changes, including through the Speak Out on 
Poverty campaign which held hearings and marches to emphasize the lack of progress – 
perhaps even regress – since the end of apartheid. A government appointed Committee of 











Committee’) joined them in calling for improvements to the social safety net which many 
had found to have “a very loose weave” (Samson 2002). Remarkably, this included a 
proposed universal basic income grant of R100 monthly, which they recommended be 
phased-in because “there is a need to first put in place appropriate capacity and 
institutional arrangements to ensure effective implementation” (RSA 2002).  
 Ideologically, key policymakers including Thabo Mbeki and Trevor Manuel, who 
controlled the purse strings for much of the period under discussion, have expressed 
skepticism about the expansion of social grants, especially to all residents. Mbeki spoke of 
the need “to cultivate the spirit of self-reliance among our people” (quoted in Marais 
2011: 252). Manuel (2007) has repeatedly stressed, as he did at a World Economic Forum 
event, that “The human condition does not allow people to live off handouts.” After 
much discussion around the radical expansion of social grants to include everyone, the 
government spokesman finally summed up the high-level opposition to the basic income 
grant by pointing to a different "philosophy" that denigrated "handouts" in favor of the 
"the opportunity, dignity and the rewards of work" (cited in Makino 2004). 
 This ideological discord is supported (perhaps even reflected) in worries about the 
administrative practicality of expanding welfare. Already in the early 1990s, the grants 
were the subject of extensive exploitation by government bureaucrats and members of the 
public. The prevalence of such activity is notoriously difficult to ascertain reliably, but 
there is general consensus that corruption and fraud are major problems, perhaps even 
"the greatest problem" (FinMark 2012a) facing the social grant program. Frequent 
reports of grant fraud in the media have been corroborated by major government and 
civil society reports (e.g. Reddy and Sokomani 2008). The problem has led to multiple 
failed audits of the administrating agencies and failures of service delivery, such as a 
dramatic example in the Eastern Cape when numerous grants went unpaid and the 
government had to take-over from its contractor.  
 These troubles influence policymaking. For example, the welfare minister Zola 
Skweyiya, who was broadly sympathetic to expanding the programs, claimed "that 
financing a BIG is less of an obstacle than administering it":  
"The system is not there, we need to create the system. I am not talking 
about the money part of it all, but the ability to be able to manage, that is 











elderly only and children. The system is not up to date at the present 
moment. Can you imagine if we have to give this (Basic Income Grant) to 
almost everybody? Will it ever be able to administer and manage that 
within two months? Do we have a civil service that is able to do that?" 
(quoted in Seekings and Matisonn 2003). 
 
 The South African Social Security Agency was largely established in response to 
these concerns, to eliminate loopholes and inequity by unifying delivery procedures. 
Furthermore, the widespread perceptions that the grants are the subject of crookedness 
and administrative incompetence have been a crucial motivating factor in the adoption of 
biometric identification. As I will trace in the next two chapters, these problems that 
enliven the political disputes about welfare are understood to be the result of a lack of 
standards and objectivity. Biometric identification has been conceived as a means of 
instituting impersonal and accurate means of delivering grants, free from human fraud or 
error. It is to the ascendance of these durable worldviews, and their material 











III.	  The	  Will	  to	  Standardize:	  Discourse	  and	  Institutional	  
Reform	  
 
ABSTRACT: This chapter traces the emergence of a particularly 
productive and durable discourse about the social grants. During the 
1990s, unifying the fragmented bureaucracy inherited from the previous 
regime became a pressing concern. The motivation for doing so arose 
from the belief that the social security system was ‘in crisis’ due to 
administrative weakness that failed to deliver grants and created the 
opportunity for widespread illicit access. Elite discourse – typified by 
government commissions and reflected in the media, Parliament, and 
elsewhere – has brought attention to these issues and successfully 
advocated for increased standardization through institutional 
centralization.  
Introduction	  
As apartheid came to a close, some observers worried that the country would fracture as 
conflicts between Inkatha, the ANC, and Afrikaner nationalists reached a violent 
crescendo. While the negotiated settlement and subsequent unifying effort of the Mandela 
era have been widely discussed, a more insidious danger lurked in the governing structure 
of post-apartheid South Africa. The National Party’s ideology of separate development 
had led to the creation of quasi-independent ‘homelands’ in the 1970s. To a significant 
degree, these entities lacked competent bureaucracies and were riddled with corruption. 
Furthermore, the provinces displayed a high degree of variability in their processes, 
technologies, and adeptness. As such, the post-apartheid state faced significant challenges 
to even basic governance.4 It was, write Seekings and Matisonn (2003), “organizational 
chaos.”  
One of the areas in which this was most evident was that of population registries. 
Despite the panoptic ambitions of the apartheid government, the basic task of registration 
was split between more than “a dozen discrete yet overlapping and duplicated population 
registers” (Breckenridge 2005b: 276). The story was similar within welfare, where the 
sector had been designated an “own affair” in 1984 for the respective racial houses of the 
tricameral parliament. The peculiar result was “the creation of costly and duplicated 
administrative structures, with 13 ‘national’ and 4 provincial head offices, plus another 3 
                                                











coordinating departments” (Lund 2008: 10-11). None of the ten ‘self-governing’ or 
‘independent’ entities were geographically whole, but had instead been spatially 
splintered (Lund 1996: 123). In the confusion of the 1980s, some of these administrative 
entities moved forward with distinct welfare reform efforts while, at the same time, the 
Pretoria government took steps toward harmonization.   
At the time, it was not obvious how the new South Africa should administer the 
welfare sector it had adopted and would subsequently expand. In the 1997 White Paper 
on Social Welfare (RSA 1997) the new government defined a policy approach it deemed 
“developmental welfare” which sought to reduce inequality and discrimination while 
linking welfare to opportunities for wage income. However, the on-the-ground reality 
began to emerge as a significant impediment to this vision. As the government began in 
earnest to address the situation, it convened a series of national commissions of inquiry. 
As Ashforth (1990) has shown, this form of official knowledge has influentially shaped the 
politics of South Africa, and it has continued in the post-apartheid era (even if the results 
differ from the pre-1994 era that is his focus). Beginning with the 1992 Mouton 
Committee of Investigation into a Retirement Provision System in South Africa, no less 
than four more major national commissions were convened between 1996 and 2000.5  
Reflecting the politics of welfare, these were primarily concerned with improving 
the delivery of social protection while reducing fraud and corruption in the system. 
Although alternatives (such as significant delegation to the provinces) were at least 
considered, these initiatives rather quickly coalesced around an understanding of the 
problem as fragmentation that impeded service delivery and created the opportunity for 
mischief. Increased uniformity required a process of standardization that, with time, was 
enacted through the administrative centralization of social protection. In order to 
illuminate the will to standardize that animates the biometric imaginary this chapter 
traces the emergence of the standardization discourse. As we shall see, the issue of 
identifying the recipients was at the forefront of these processes. 
                                                
5 These were the 1996 Chikane Committee for the Restructuring of Social Security, the 1996 
Lund Committee on Child and Family Support, the 1998 Public Service Commission 
Investigation into Social Security Services, and the 2002 Taylor Committee on Comprehensive 












In early 1996, Frank Chikane, a special advisor to vice-president Thabo Mbeki, was 
appointed to lead the Committee for Restructuring of Social Security which was tasked with 
investigating integration and improvements of the public welfare system. The report is 
motivated by the disarray of governance in the 1990s and opens by stating that “the 
delivery of social security is in crisis” (CRSS 1996: 5). Fragmentation into fourteen 
separate systems, each with particular management, rules, and procedures, created the 
opportunity for loopholes “which could easily be exploited by unscrupulous officials and 
members of the public.” Of the R11.5 billion paid out to 2.8 million beneficiaries in 
1995-1996, it is estimated that about ten percent is lost to fraud and corruption. As it 
reports, “fraud and corruption are rampant as a consequence of a lack of systems, proper 
internal controls, unduly complex legislation and department rules governing internal 
disciplinary proceedings.” This malfeasance is said to “represent the greatest threat to the 
programme” of welfare, requiring a “complete re-engineering” (23). While it mentioned 
the possibility that some tasks could be decentralized, this potential was not the subject of 
further detail; instead, the Committee focused on unifying and standardizing a national 
system in which, as a result, it is believed that the detection of fraud would be easier. The 
report also emphasized the need for “linkages with other systems be established such as 
the Home Affairs, Population Registration System, other pension insurance funds, South 
African Police Services (SAPS), Deeds Registry, the provincial financial control systems, 
and post offices and banks” (6).6 Specific recommendations for the social security system 
are offered, including a nationally organized system, a national human resources strategy, 
a standardized and integrated management system, a “national transverse information 
system,” and regulatory simplifications. Thus, standardization was a task both within 
social security and between other government programs. 
The Chikane Committee was particularly concerned about the means of 
identifying beneficiaries. Recall that at the end of apartheid, there existed various and 
incomplete population registers; in many cases, individuals lacked identification 
documents, especially those former citizens of the ‘independent’ territories. The will to 
standardize deeply influenced how the Committee approached the issue of identification, 
                                                
6 This interoperability between previously distinct databases is indicative of Garfinkel’s (2000) 











particularly biometrics: “The benefits of a biometric system can only be reaped if there is 
a uniform system for the country as a whole used by the Social Welfare and Home Affairs 
departments” (44). They were deeply concerned that the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, 
Northern Province, KwaZulu Natal and Mpumalanga were in various stages of issuing 
biometric contracts, enrolling beneficiaries, and using the different proprietary systems for 
delivery. They argued that a uniform system would allow duplicates to be identified, such 
as individuals receiving grants in more than one province. “Without a national fingerprint 
data-base [sic] this gives no assurance that the person is who they claim to be.” That is, 
the Committee’s opposition to biometrics was not in principle – as some privacy 
advocates would be – but rather in practice. It was concerned with the difficulty of a 
creating a functioning system, noting that inaccuracies in the database would be difficult 
to ferret out, and the amalgamation of different systems may compound the data integrity 
problem. It noted that costs were likely to come down, so that rushed approaches would 
undermine the goal of administrative affordability. 
Furthermore, given the evidence available about the effectiveness of biometric 
identification, the Chikane Committee expressed skepticism about their promised benefits 
with regard to fraud and corruption. As early as 1993, welfare administrators in the Cape 
Province had tested biometric identification to root out individuals receiving multiple 
grants; yet, of the 190,000 recipients enrolled, the biometric system only highlighted 
1,040 potential duplicates (those fingerprints deemed close enough to warrant suspicion). 
When they further investigated 254 of those potential ‘double dippers,’ only 32 were 
found to be actual duplicates—the rest were simply similar fingerprints. The problem was 
compounded by the cost of biometric identification: in the provinces where biometric 
identification was being used, the cost was reportedly between R15 and R20 per month 
per beneficiary, with “the biometric features costing at least half of that total.” In contrast, 
the non-biometric identification system in Mpumalanga cost R6.50. In the Western 
Cape, the biometric system was said to cost R1.9 million per month, compared to the 
R16,500 per month savings from identifying 32 duplicates.7 According to the Committee, 
“Biometric testing would have to identify and stop fraudulent payment in excess of 2 
                                                
7 The general lack of objective cost and benefit analysis for biometrics has continued to this day 
(and been noted globally by scholars [e.g. Magnet 2011; Gelb and Clark 2013]), even as the 











percent of all claims to justify this high cost. Preliminary evidence in the Western Cape 
suggests that only 0.015 percent of applications were found to be duplicates.” Given the 
lack of interoperability between the provincial identification systems, the Committee 
matter-of-factly noted “a photograph could also fulfill” the goal of making sure a recipient 
is who they say they are. As they conclude, “The [Committee] is gravely concerned that 
the outsourcing of biometric identification is premature, costly and will not necessarily 
eliminate fraud.” 
This concern was exacerbated by indications of corruption in the tendering 
process. As early as 1992, the Cape Provincial Administration (predominantly responsible 
for what is today the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape provinces) had been 
approached by an entrepreneurial firm offering “a solution for the fraud that was 
rampant with welfare payments” and had “received considerable coverage in the press” 
(Cameron and Brand 2006: 57). This firm, 3D-ID, was able to convince the CPA that an 
automated fingerprint technology it had exclusively imported from California offered a 
means to solve this problem. 3D-ID not only demonstrated their technology to the CPA 
officials but even assisted “with the compilation of the tender documents” (Hartzenberg 
1999) which required that “[a]ll recipients of social pensions and other welfare grants 
must be enrolled on software capable of registering fingerprints and such software must 
be able to positively identify and verify recipients” (quoted in Cameron and Brand 2006: 
31). Thus, it came as quite a surprise when a previously unknown company, Nisec, was 
awarded the contract in 1994—a development that cast the suspicion reflected in the 
Chikane Committee (CRSS 1996: 37). It was only years later, however, that a sufficient 
investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) demonstrated that two 
government officials had accepted lucrative positions in the Nisec firm in return for 
awarding them the tender. The corruption would eventually ensnarl the NP’s senior 
welfare official, Abe Williams (who went to jail in 2000 after the OSEO investigation 
uncovered his unscrupulous dealings) and lead to the cancellation of the Nisec contract, 
unable as it was to deliver grants reliably. 
The	  Investigation	  into	  the	  Delivery	  of	  Social	  Security	  Services	  
In the years following the Chikane Committee the depiction of the problem and solution 











was the necessary response. The archive yields few dissenting voices, especially among the 
representations of the elite. The 1997 White Paper on Social Welfare declared “social 
assistance programmes will be made more efficient through the rationalization of the 
system” (RSA 1997: 19). Fragmentation had, it asserted, led to “gross inefficiencies” and 
“loopholes… which could be exploited by officials and the public” (51). The “manual 
system” for accounting and “the lack of an integrated national ID system” were 
specifically cited as problems. “A uniform social grants system”, it reasoned, required “the 
rationalization of computer systems and the development of a National Social Grants 
Register and automated fingerprint technology” (54). To do so, it called for a national re-
registration process for grant beneficiaries, in order to produce an accurate database.  
 The sense of calamity was exacerbated by a prominent 1997 revelation from the 
Mail & Guardian newspaper that estimated R1 billion was being lost to pension fraud from 
an annual budget of R14.3 billion (see Reddy and Sokomani 2008: 19). A major report in 
the following year from a government watchdog, the Public Service Commission (PSC), 
detailed the state of service delivery and proposed a variety of institutional and technical 
reforms. The PSC’s Investigation into the Delivery of Social Security Services argued, like its 
predecessors, that the troubles of the social security program were the result of a lack of 
standards, in the data captured from applicants, the complexity of regulations, the 
“varying interpretations of eligibility,” and the methods of payment. It recommended the 
“development of a national policy to standardise” paperwork, bureaucratic procedures, 
and identity documents (PSC 1998: ix).   
It also attended to the techniques of identification, noting that provinces had 
adopted their own approach to fingerprinting applicants. These differed “from that 
utilized by the Department of Home Affairs, which is responsible for verifying 
fingerprints” so the PSC (1998: 29) recommended the Home Affairs standard prevail. 
Even more, officials were untrained in capturing biometrics, resulting in poor quality 
prints that would need to be manually checked because Home Affairs had not 
computerized their database. In response, they recommended that identification forms 
should ideally be computerized, but at the very least printed forms should be the same. 
When the report received additional attention at a series of Parliamentary hearings in 











example, members of the Executive Councils from Free State and the Eastern Cape 
complained of the identification troubles facing their provinces: in Free State, it was 
alleged that citizens from Lesotho claimed South African pensions; in the Eastern Cape, 
former Transkei and Ciskei citizens lacked the new ID books while others had both the 
new ID books and older identity documents that were still accepted, thus able to benefit 
twice (Saloojee 1998). 
 The PSC’s report reasoned through the institutional structures most likely able to 
deliver the social grants in a manner keeping with the various demands of the democratic 
era. A decentralized model where “each province develops its own social security service” 
was rejected due to limited accountability and the recognition that “all citizens of South 
Africa should be treated equally” (PSC 1998: 12). A centralized structure, they noted, 
would be most agreeable in terms of equity, but they recognized that the goal of equity 
may need to be balanced against efficiency. The report noted that “the enhancement of 
efficiency is not only achieved through mechanically designing every transaction of the 
service and standardizing its structures and processes, but also through empowering 
people on the service delivery level” (13). As such, it recommended what it called a 
“hybrid” approach, where policies, regulations, norms, standards, and technical systems 
are set nationally but provincial departments are responsible for the actual delivery. (In 
practice, though, this was a significant shift from the provincial approach of the day.) 
Standardization	  through	  Institutional	  Centralization	  
These institutional recommendations received an important boost in early 2002 from the 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for 
South Africa (led by Viviene Taylor) which recommended the establishment of the South 
African Social Security Agency, an entity introduced in the 2004 South African Social 
Security Agency Act (Act no.9 of 2004). Initial steps had begun earlier within the 
government, but this was high-profile support that seemed particularly necessary given a 
spate of high-profile failures on the part of provincial government to deliver grants 
reliably. Provinces were often incapable of basic administrative activity, with the Eastern 
Cape receiving particular attention. As Overy and Zuma (2004) summarize, “Between 
1994 and 2003, the Eastern Cape provincial government earned itself a reputation for 











national and provincial media reported widely on instances of maladministration and 
corruption…” This sensationally came to the fore when the Eastern Cape government 
had “to suspend social security payments after it had overspent its annual pension budget 
by 2.4 billion rand barely halfway through the fiscal year” (Dollery and Snowball 2003: 
22).  
The goal of SASSA is to serve as “the sole agency that will ensure the efficient and 
effective management, administration, and payment of social assistance” (RSA 2002). As 
Selwyn Jehoma (2003a), the head of grants for the Department of Social Development, 
told Parliament in February 2003, in addition to providing clear accountability, 
integrating social security within a national agency would permit “standardization and 
uniform business processes” which would “reduce costs of service delivery.” Further, 
“[p]ractices of double dipping into funds would also not be possible with an Agency as the 
institution would have a better grip on social services.” Social Development Minister 
Skewyiya reiterated this, saying that “financial leaks had n cessitated the centralization of 
control and payment of grants, leading to the formation of a social security agency that 
would do the job” (Radebe 2006). The creation of SASSA ended the assignment of grant 
administration to the provinces, a practice instituted by Presidential Proclamation No. 
R.7 of 1996 (Mandela 1996) that amended the 1992 Social Assistance Act. The new 
legislation directed SASSA to administer grants and populate a national database for all 
social assistance beneficiaries. As Mr. Jehoma (2003b) told Parliament a few months later, 
this was necessary because “it was not possible to give all nine provinces a set of guidelines 
and expect them to interpret and implement them in the same way, mainly because they 
had such different working realities to contend with. At present the norms and standards 
were interpreted differently and a nationally guided process was needed.” While few in 
Parliament advocated otherwise, at least some civil society organizations were skeptical of 
the centralization; the Black Sash worried that SASSA would merely “replicate the 
existing dysfunctions of the system” and that “the new system overlooks the political, 
social and technological nuances in each province” (Robinson 2005). Their protest, 
though, was ineffectual. 
 SASSA, then, has been tasked with homogenizing the policy and implementation 











facilitated illicit behavior, it was also at odds with the egalitarian ethos of the newly 
democratic nation. For instance, not only did quality of service differ wildly, fundamental 
definitions of, say, what counted as disability meant that applicants may qualify for a 
grant in one province, but not if they move to another (Reddy and Sokomani 2008). In 
the context of hard-fought equality, the grants, then, became a means of aspiring to and 
establishing uniformity of citizenship (cf. Peebles 2008; Ferguson 2002).8 Some of the 
concrete ways in which this has been done will be discussed in chapter five. 
Conclusion	  
As Busch (2011: 33) notes, “the emergence of standards is almost invariably the result of 
conflict or disagreement." In the case of South Africa, the situation inherited from the 
apartheid government made basic governance supremely difficult, and the Chikane 
Committee was one of the earliest examples of the will to standardize processes, 
institutions, and technologies to overcome such conflict and disagreement. In the 
following years, the belief that grants were in crisis due to a lack of standards that created 
delivery problems and fraudulent access widened into conventional wisdom. 
Subsequently, a response that merged institutional and technological innovation was 
enacted.  
Importantly, this turned out to be a process of centralization, though this history 
also reveals the paths not taken: the PSC’s 1998 report considers provincial management, 
but ultimately rejects it as at odds with the goal of equity. Not all standards require 
centralization (language, for one, is structured in a more distributive fashion [Grewal 
2008]), but in this case, the keywords of the era – standardized, uniform, comprehensive, 
and integrated – proved convivial with institutional centralization.  
Finally, this ethos of standardization has been particularly influential for the issue 
of identification.9 As the Chikane Committee clearly elucidated, a national-level 
                                                
8 Further indicative of Ferguson’s (2002) emphasis on the importance of space is that, in addition 
to the more technical means of standardizing information infrastructures, SASSA has invested 
significantly in overcoming and regularizing the spatial infrastructure of grants, such as through 
mounting ATMs on 4x4 trucks and issuing quality standards for the facilities that serve as 
monthly pay points.  
9 With the emphasis on standardization and centralization, it would be easy to see this effort in 
terms of James Scott’s influential theory of state simplification and high-modernism; however, as 
is often ignored in invocations of his book, only when combined with an authoritarian state and 











identification system is desirable for the potential to root our duplicates and ensure 
accuracy. Their pragmatic reasons for rejecting biometric welfare identification at the 
time – arising from a cost-benefit analysis and investigation into the technical capabilities 
– were motivated by the same concerns about effective service delivery and fraud that 
today result in the push for biometric identification. What has changed in the intervening 
years is exactly what the Committee advocated: national centralization and 
standardization have been enacted, meaning that the contradictions internal to the 
biometric imaginary have been considerably smoothed through the technopolitics of 
standardization. But before turning to that experience in chapter five, the next chapter 
introduces the second technopolitical motivator of the biometric imaginary: the pursuit of 
objectivity.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Given the anti-paternalistic stand of welfare administration in South Africa, and the 1994 
transition, this is largely not a problem, though for some populations (such as refugees and other 











IV.	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Objectivity:	  The	  Growth	  of	  
Quantitative	  Evidence	  in	  Welfare	  Policymaking	  
 
ABSTRACT: This chapter turns to the second underlying dynamic of the 
biometric imaginary: the pursuit of objectivity. The pursuit of 
objectivity has been an effort to remove subjective and discretionary 
practices in favor of a rule-bound egalitarianism. As shown in the next 
chapter, this drive has influenced grant delivery, but it has also shaped 
the types of knowledge deemed legitimate. In order to demonstrate the 
broader importance of objectivity within post-apartheid social policy I 
discuss the rise of quantitative evidence within policymaking, showing 
how a profusion of statistical information was employed in the debates 
around the social grants. 
Introduction	  
Closely related to the will to standardize has been a pursuit of objectivity. The democratic 
era has been premised on an end to the formalities of discrimination that characterized 
apartheid; this has meant a suspicion of arbitrary power and an openness to challenging 
authority. The Weberian affinity exhibited by liberal political orders for rule-bound 
structures has pervaded post-apartheid social protection. The next chapter argues that 
biometric identification is a result of this drive, but before doing so, this chapter illustrates 
the broader trend through a discussion of the types of knowledge used in social 
policymaking.  
 As Porter (1996) has argued, disputes within a liberal political order tend to 
gravitate toward ‘objective’ evidence because subjective claims are debased as personal, 
discretionary, and unrepresentative. As Daston and Galison (2007: 199) emphasize, 
‘objective’ should not be defined as synonymous with ‘truth,’ but rather as the inverse of 
‘subjective.’ Subjectivity, they say, is “the yin to objectivity’s yang,” meaning one cannot 
be defined but in absence of the other. This dynamic has swayed the types of evidence 
that is brought to bear on disputes around the social grants. Quantitative evidence – 
where impartial statistical rules reduce subjective bias – has grown in importance, and 
both government and civil society have increased their use of numerical testimony. The 
contested politics of social grants – particularly debates over affordability and effectiveness 













Critics on both the left and right have often presented “the quantitative mentality as 
morally indefensible, an obstacle to utopia” (Porter 1996: 73). The apartheid 
government’s “mania for measurement” (Posel 2000: 116) would seem to support the 
view that quantification is an instrument of totalitarian power. As Posel writes, 
“aspirations of totalizing modes of racialised knowledge” led bureaucrats to engage in 
“rituals of often absurdly detailed quantitative measurements”, yet, despite their role in 
enabling and perpetuating the apartheid regime, statistics often failed to provide reliable 
measures in practice and perhaps even undermined the state’s capacity. On the ground, 
bureaucrats often ignored official figures, and the limited interests of the apartheid 
government meant that key data was ignored, such as poverty and inequality. For 
example, “between 1976 and 1994, official statistics excluded the TBVC countries – the 
former ‘homelands’ of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei – on the ground 
that these were ‘independent states’, thus automatically excluding a large portion of the 
poor from official statistics” (May, Woolard, and Klasen 2000). Similarly, while there 
existed a vibrant private research sector and strong opinion polling by the state, “both 
were usually prevented by a range of political and technical factors from surveying the 
majority of black South Africans” (Mattes 2012: 175). 
 As with the drive for standardization in post-apartheid South Africa, the use of 
quantification in social policy wa  driven initially by efforts at administrative reform. The 
paucity of available information was a considerable handicap for policymakers in post-
1994 South Africa, perhaps most a hindrance in social policy where the ANC 
government needed to address the stark realities of apartheid with haste. Cognizant of 
this knowledge gap, a variety of stakeholders from government and academia have 
contributed to a sea change, because of which the country is now “awash with statistics” 
(Seekings 2006: 1). Part of this was facilitated by the removal of obstructions that existed 
under the previous regime that was hostile to independent inquiry - a statistical 
permissiveness that accompanied other such collapses of authoritarian political systems in 
the 1990s (Mattes 2007: 113). In addition, the ANC partnered with the World Bank and 
the University of Cape Town to implement the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living 











statistical agency (“Stats SA”) has since invested in a multitude of surveys, often with a 
priority on the conditions of the poor:  
“Besides collecting standard economic statistics and a five-yearly 
Population Census (in 1996 and 2001), Stats SA has conducted an annual 
household survey (the October Household Survey or OHS from 1994 to 
1999, and the General Household Survey or GHS from 2002), a bi-annual 
Labour Force Survey (LFS, since 2000), and a five-yearly Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES, in 1995, 2000 and 2005). Unlike its counterparts 
in some other countries, Stats SA does an excellent job in putting its data 
into the public domain. Universities as well as the parastatal Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) have also undertaken many cross-
sectional and panel surveys… Most recently, the Presidency has 
commissioned a National Income Dynamics Study, which is to be a 
household panel study.” 
 
In other cases, the enumeration was more purposeful. As Pundy Pillay, formerly head of 
Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services in the Presidency, relates, in the post-
apartheid era “one of the obstacles to setting up a national anti-poverty programme was 
the lack of information on the poor – who they are, where they live, why they are poor, 
and what would be the best way to overcome the twin problem of poverty and inequality” 
(Pillay 2000). 
For example, the team behind the Child Support Grant needed to develop an 
early childhood development initiative that would reliably reach and positively impact 
low-income families, but the paucity of data hampered their efforts. The head of that 
effort recounts that “we did not know about the cost of universal provision; we also didn’t 
know about what services were being delivered in the fragmented bits of states which had 
been created over the past forty years” (Lund 1996: 122). As such, they had to raise 
money for 17 baseline studies of welfare administration. As Lund (1996) relates, welfare 
reformers embarked upon the Herculean task to “count everything. Count people… 
Count facilities… Count equipment.” Still, in some cases, they were reliant on 
information from the 1985 Carnegie Conference on Poverty – at that point more than ten 
years old (Lund 2008: 36). They also later found that their projections at the time were 
based on inaccurate demographic data, leading to erroneous consensus. Even as late as 
the mid-2000s, data quality was “far from perfect” (Budlender et al. 2008: 52), though the 











Quantification	  as	  Defense	  
As the numerical lacuna began to fill by the turn of the century, quantitative evidence 
became a key modality of technopolitics around the social grants. While the 1990s were 
characterized by an initial flourishing of data collection due to the removal of 
authoritarian barriers and the need for data to inform novel policy arenas, these 
motivations have shifted as the grants have become the subject of the contested politics 
discussed in chapter two. Under fire from critics as profligate and unaffordable spending 
and the cause of dependency and perverse incentives, supporters of the grants have 
sought to defend them through the creation of a massive body of quantitative data about 
the effectiveness and affordability of the grants, even using it to justify a proposed radical 
expansion, in the form of the universal basic income grant. 
Parts of the government have played an important role in cultivating and using 
numbers for social protection advocacy. One of the most notable ways in which this has 
been done is through a sizeable, sophisticated, and sustained commitment to impact 
assessment by the Department of Social Development (DSD) and others. In 2004, DSD 
released a report (Samson et al. 2004) on The Social and Economic Impact of South Africa’s Social 
Security System which documented in nearly 300 pages the grants’ “critical role in reducing 
poverty and promoting social development.” It quantified evidence of impact on health, 
education, housing and other vital services. It further assessed the influence on labor 
market participation and productivity, as well as macroeconomic indicators such as 
savings, consumption, and aggregate demand. (It is not coincidental that these are the 
type of indicators privileged within the wider political discourse discussed above.)  
Two years later, DSD released a massive, three-volume survey of grant 
beneficiaries (de Koker et al. 2006). The study was undertaken by a team of academics, 
consultants, and representatives of the parastatal Human Sciences Research Council and 
in nearly 700 pages reports on a wide variety of numerical indicators from just under 
7,000 grant recipients.10 More recently, in conjunction with SASSA and UNICEF, DSD 
                                                
10 There is a parallel history to be told of the tools and instruments through which such enormous 
data collection efforts are made possible. As Mattes (2007) notes, many of the approaches 
common in the West are untenable in South Africa; yet, ““knowing” requires a range of 
inscription techniques, transportation means, [and] calculation methods” (Miller and Rose 1990). 
In the case of this survey, laptops, GPS devices and the DSD’s database were all necessary to 











has managed two sophisticated assessments of the Child Support Grant (DSD, SASSA, 
and  UNICEF 2011; DSD, SASSA, and UNICEF 2012). Both studies include an 
extended technical discussion of the methodology, emphasizing the thoroughness of their 
“gold standard” approach. Notably, one of these studies is actually a qualitative 
investigation, relying on focus groups and informant interviews, but here, too, the 
methodological rigor is discussed in considerable detail to emphasize the objectivity and 
representativeness of the work. They take care to show that the qualitative research is a 
precursor to the quantitative work that will “add depth and context”, and is thus not a 
standalone piece. Finally, the Department of Social Development has also used 
quantitative evidence (to attempt) to settle specific debates, such as rumors of the CSG 
encouraging teenage pregnancy (e.g. Kesho Consulting & Business Solutions 2006).  
Quantification	  as	  Advocacy	  
In addition to the use of quantification to defend social protection against those that 
would curtail it, an influential lobby has used statistical data collection and modeling to 
show the limitations of the program at various points in its history. Indeed, one of the 
primary motivations for the creation and use of quantitative data about poor South 
Africans has been advocacy for improvements to the social protection system, including 
its expansion. This has been enabled by the availability of official statistics and a political 
environment that allows challenges to the state and has a broad mandate to alleviate 
poverty and inequality. The strongest voices for the improvement of the social grants 
have been academically-inclined civil society organizations that have demonstrated 
through surveys, models, and other quantitative analysis various shortcomings of the 
implementation, though it has also been a tactic of government. 
For example, the former Deputy Director of DSD reports that despite media 
attention and internal perceptions of widespread losses due to corruption in the social 
protection system, “it took a while for the National Treasury to believe that the 
Department was in fact experiencing such acute losses and they were convinced only after 
the department had presented concrete evidence in the form of two baselines studies in 
2002 and 2003” (Jehoma, in Reddy and Sokomani 2008: 19). As with other types of 











Treasury of implementation problems) are a “key fidelity technique in new strategies of 
government” (Rose 1999: 155).  
Audits have also been carried out by critics of government effectiveness. In a 
different context, Hetherington (2011) has documented how grassroots organizations act 
as “guerilla auditors”, enrolling larger discourses and techniques of accountability, 
transparency, and efficiency in their own agendas that may or may not align with those of 
the elite. A similar dynamic has unfolded in post-apartheid South Africa (though the 
‘guerillas’ are relatively well-established and work less in an adversarial vein than the term 
may imply). A handful of entities have been involved with monitoring implementation 
and advocating for its improvement and expansion. Most relevant for the discussion of 
quantification as a technique of political advocacy are the Children’s Institute at the 
University of Cape Town and the Economic and Policy Research Institute. The annual 
South African Child Gauge from the Children’s Institute, for example, is a data-rich 
report that aims to “monitor government and civil society’s progress towards realizing 
children’s rights” through numerical indicators of access to social services (Hall, Woolard, 
and Smith 2012).  
 One of the earlier examples of statistical advocacy was an effort to ensure the 
grant amounts increased in line with inflation. As Budlender et al. (2008: 17) explain,  
“The amount of the CSG remained static for the first few years at 
R100 per month, even while the amount of other grants increased in 
line with inflation... In 2000, the Children’s Institute and ACESS 
asked IDASA to investigate the extent to which the value of the grant 
decreased in real terms. These calculations showed that, by March 
2000 already, the real value of the grant fell to R90.50 if measured in 
1998 rands… These calculations were used by the Children’s Institute, 
the Black Sash and ACESS to motivate for an increase in the CSG 
amount in several submissions in 2000 and 2001 to the Department of 
Social Development and the Taylor Committee. The first increase – 
to R110 per month – came into effect in July 2001. Since then, the 
amount has been increased each year to cover inflation, and 
sometimes a bit more.”  
 
 A prominent example of how statistical evidence has been used to improve the 
implementation of the social protection is the growth of the Child Support Grant. 
Following its introduction in 1998, the grant had very limited take-up amongst eligible 











population in the millions (Lund 2008: 76). A major reason for the limited take-up of the 
CSG was the onerous administrative requirements for recipients, including a means test 
that proved counterproductive and exclusionary. Civil society organizations were vocal 
monitors of the slow take-up of the CSG, numerically demonstrating the barriers to 
access (e.g. Goldblatt et al. 2006; Leatt 2004; 2006; Rosa et al. 2005). The gap was 
significant and “there was a good deal of dissatisfaction among the public and in parts of 
the welfare department about the ‘slow take-up rate’” (Lund 2008: 76). Eventually, the 
evidence-based advocacy succeeded in compelling new regulations that simplified 
procedures, as well as new investments in outreach. The result has been a steady growth 
in the adoption of the CSG.  
 A less successful example of guerilla auditors compelling the expansion of social 
protection was the now stagnant movement for a basic income grant. Although the BIG 
Coalition, too, offered sophisticated financial models to demonstrate the impact and 
affordability of a universal grant (e.g. Samson 2002), it lacked the resources of the 
Children’s Institute and was arguing for a policy that faced far higher barriers to 
acceptance, especially within the small circle of policymakers around Thabo Mbeki and 
Trevor Manuel who espoused a different “philosophy” with regard to welfare (see 
Makino 2004). In practice, their numerical testimony was shelved in favor of quantitative 
analysts who argued for expanding the CSG instead of universalizing the grants (e.g. van 
der Berg and Bredenkamp 2002).   
Conclusion	  
Despite its reputation for maniacal enumeration, the apartheid regime’s gaze was 
directed at the specific issues in which it was interested (see Breckenridge 2012; cf. 
Graeber 2012). Only in the 1990s did more representative data begin to be generated. 
Much of this was prompted by the pressing concerns of the day, including poverty 
alleviation. In time, statistics have become enrolled in programs of advocacy and reform. 
The characteristics of quantitative evidence that make it attractive, including its 
representativeness, are particularly useful as a “technology of trust” (Porter 1996: 15), 
enabling coordination amongst strangers by constraining personal motivations through 











 However, this does not, of course, mean the absence of interests and the end of 
discretion. The increase in quantification can actually be understood as a result of 
ongoing competition between interests; as Nikolas Rose (1999: 27) observes, “To govern, 
one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for one’s authority.” Those 
vulnerable due to opposition need to resort to quantifying their justifications. This is 
notable because while welfare is a constitutional right in South Africa, the defense has 
had to supersede an appeal to rights, adopting an instrumentalist approach, 
demonstrating developmental effectiveness and financial affordability of social grants. 
One would not expect such effort to be expended on objectively proving the impact of the 
grants if they were securely instituted and enjoyed near universal support (as do other 
rights, such as voting). This vulnerability and need to demonstrate objectivity has 
influenced more than just the forms of knowledge considered legitimate; it has also 











V.	  Standardization	  &	  Objectivity	  in	  the	  Adoption	  of	  
Biometric	  Social	  Grant	  Identification	  
 
ABSTRACT: In addition to institutional structure and policymaking 
knowledge, standardization and objectivity have influenced social grant 
implementation. In particular, the persistence of illicit access to social 
grants and wayward bureaucratic action have been acknowledged as 
widespread problems by the bureaucratic and policy elite. Years of 
actual and attempted reform have culminated in the recent enrolment 
of 21 million grant beneficiaries in a biometric identification scheme 
that is explicitly framed as a means of automating processes and 
providing, in the words of SASSA (2011), “sameness of Beneficiary 
experience.” 
Introduction	  
Beginning in March 2012 and continuing for more than a year, millions of residents 
across the whole of South Africa queued at government offices in order to be re-registered 
in a new grant administration system. The crucial task – from the government’s point of 
view – was capturing the biometric data of more than 21 million grant beneficiaries in a 
unified, central database. Elderly pensioners, the disabled, and caregivers of all ages with 
their children were photographed and their ten fingerprints were captured to be 
compared against the full database with the aim of removing any duplicate entries. A 
finger would also be the primary means of authenticating themselves for their monthly 
payment, and SASSA’s contractor, Net1 CPS, was simultaneously busy expanding its 
network of fingerprint readers at third-party merchants who would serve as cash 
dispensers. In case a fingerprint scanner was unavailable, the grant recipients also 
provided a voice recording, to serve as a back-up means of verifying individuals at the 
time of payment.   
In addition to bureaucratic structures and policy knowledge, fragmented and 
discretionary practice has come under scrutiny in post-apartheid welfare. This chapter 
presents the enormous technopolitical undertaking of 2012-2013 as the result of the same 
bureaucratic commitments to standardization and objectivity that have previously 
motivated administrative centralization and the growth of statistical reasoning. Two 
forms of subjective practice have continued to trouble the bureaucratic and policy elite: 











biometric identification has been conceived as a way to deliver grants impartially and 
uniformly, thus removing these practices. Although biometric technology has been used 
in grant delivery for at least two decades, the 2012 SASSA contract with Net1 CPS 
represents an unprecedented apogee for the sector: a nationally centralized database of 21 
million grant beneficiaries who are to be biometrically identified for each payment.  
Bedeviling	  Discretion:	  Fraud,	  Corruption	  &	  Bureaucratic	  Weakness	  
As introduced in chapter three, since the early 1990s the social grants have been depicted 
as ‘in crisis’ due to fraud and corruption. Historically, fraud has occurred in innumerable 
ways, from a 2008 case where just three people absconded with R22 million (including 
R1.8 million in false invoices to SASSA) (Zulu 2008), to more everyday acts of 
dissimulation, such as “looking poor” to pass the means test (Plagerson, Harpham, and 
Kielmann 2012; see also Versfeld 2012). In conversations with and public statements by 
SASSA officials, two practices are considered particularly widespread. First, there is 
concern about “phantom twins,” the practice of registering fictional children in order to 
receive extra grants (one town reportedly had more than 100 twins in 2010 [Piloso 
2010]). Secondly, there is a perception that deceased pensioners are not reported as dead, 
and relatives continue to collect money on their behalf. This form of fraud is often linked 
to the use of bank accounts, where money is traditionally deposited without verifying the 
recipient is alive.11 
The illegal nature of the behavior makes estimating the extent of this problem 
quite difficult, but numerous entities have tried. The Chikane Committee estimated that 
10 percent of the R11.5 billion budget had been lost. The next year, a report from the 
Mail & Guardian put the figure at R1 billion, a little less than 7 percent of a R14.3 billion 
budget. In 2006, the estimated losses were R1.4 billion, though substantial growth in the 
overall budget decreased it (relatively) to 2.5 percent (Reddy and Sokomani 2008). After 
its formation, SASSA partnered with the Special Investigating Unit, and between 2006 
and March 2012 prosecuted 20,554 people for fraud and corruption; in all, 46,237 
individuals have signed acknowledgements of debt totaling R304.9 million (Timm 2012). 
These figures filter through Parliamentary hearings and budget speeches, news 
reports and opinion pieced, and the daily discussions in South African society. When the 
                                                











Democratic Alliance recently said in Parliament that the Department of Social 
Development was “crippled by managerial dysfunction” and facing “a management 
crisis” (Waters 2013) or the when Inkatha Freedom Party labeled “all SASSA offices 
across the country as… breeding grounds for corruption” (Inkatha 2013), their rhetoric 
was not particularly uncommon, nor was it merely opposition politicking. President 
Mbeki (2004), too, stridently spoke on the issue, saying “We must be impatient with those 
in the public service who see themselves as pen-pushers and guardians of rubber stamps, 
thieves intent on self-enrichment, bureaucrats who think they have a right to ignore the 
vision of Batho Pele [‘People First’], who come to work as late as possible, work as little as 
possible and knock off early as possible.” The leaders of DSD and SASSA are also quick 
to admit widespread fraud and corruption, with Minister Dlamini calling it “endemic” in 
the SASSA 2011/2012 Annual Report. The fraud and corruption which motivates much of 
this discourse is enormously difficult to assess accurately, but this ambiguity is rarely 
noted. Instead, it is the perception of crisis which is productive – based in, but not 
congruent, with facts. Roitman (2011) has called for an understanding of “the kinds of 
work the term crisis is or is not doing” and at least two of the results in this particular case 
are the removal of ambiguity and the investment in biometric identification. 
Mbeki’s statement above explicitly links fraud to the second form of discretionary 
activity to which biometrics are a response: the wayward behavior of middle- and low-
level bureaucrats, especially those at the street-level. In many cases, the two are linked, 
but there is also a stand-alone concern that error and incompetence undermine the 
effectiveness and equality of service. 
For pro-poor civil society organizations, bureaucrats have historically been found 
to be an impediment to the goal of improving legitimate access to the grants. This was 
most evident during the early years of the Child Support Grant when organizations like 
the Children’s Institute and Black Sash (CI and BS 2000) highlighted “worrying… reports 
that applicants are often dissuaded from persisting with applications because of the 
attitude of welfare officials.” “Access to social security,” they noted, “is a constitutional 
right but applicants find the application process humiliating and degrading.” As Simon 
Kimani (2000) of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers told Parliament, 











particularly problematic by some due to the inability or unwillingness of private firms to 
provide quality services (see Overy & Zuma 2004). 
The process of applying for grants has been called “torturous” because there  “are 
no uniform standards, assessment guidelines and procedures, and some officials 
themselves do not know of or understand the procedures” (Guthrie 2002) and observers 
have demanded that “Welfare officials need to be educated to recognise that they are 
assisting in the realisation of a constitutional right and are not simply handing out 
charity” (CI and BS 2000; see also Rosa and Mpokotho 2006). The problems run the 
gamut from the meaningful but mundane (demanding extraneous documents or evidence 
beyond the formal requirements [Budlender et al. 2006]) to the corrupt (security guards at 
pay points demanding bribes [Williams 2012]) to the lurid (such as the case of a 
bureaucrat offering grants in exchange for underage sex [Mboyisa 2009]). The 
prevalence of this behavior has been found to create fear amongst grant recipients of 
trusting SASSA officials (DSD, SASSA, and UNICEF 2011). As Francie Lund and 
colleagues (2009) note, “administrative discretion appears to be subverting the aim of the 
broader social policy.” They particularly note that policies such as Batho Pele and laws 
like the Administrative Justice Act (which requires that “organs of state may not act 
capriciously and arbitrarily”) are not effective at managing bureaucratic behavior.  
The problems have been exacerbated by the work environment. Offices have 
often been poorly maintained and lacking key infrastructure such as reliable electricity or 
connectivity. In one dramatic example, the head of SASSA related the tale of a snake-
infested file storage room in Limpopo (Peterson 2011). Paperwork and documents have 
been particularly troubling. Instead of documents serving to make the population legible, 
documents have often unsettled the state’s practices and goals (cf. Scott 1998). For 
beneficiaries, a lack of identity documents has been one of the major barriers to accessing 
the grants. Budlender et al. (2008) detail how “officials were requiring documents and 
other evidence far beyond what the law dictated, which amounted to asking applicants to 
‘jump through hoops’”. Early in the Child Support Grant this was recognized as a 
barrier, and lobbying removed some of the requirements for children (Lund 2008: 75) but 
it still took a lawsuit – only decided in 2008 – to permit a broader array of documents, 











receiving their grants, problems with documentation was the leading cause, at 22 percent 
(Leibbrandt et al. 2010).  
For street-level bureaucrats, key forms have been lost or missing, in the wrong 
language, or open to forgery (Kimani 2000). During the 1990s, there was “no way of 
verifying the authenticity” of applicants’ documents (PSC 1998), especially if they were
issued by entities with whom the welfare administration had little interoperability (most
importantly Home Affairs, though in time this has been improved). At other times, it was 
the democratic transition that led to documentary problems: in a 2001 report from the
Auditor-General, 225,471 computer-generated ID numbers were identified, formally the
solution for those who only had IDs from the apartheid era, but in practice the means of 
creating false entries by unscrupulous bureaucrats (Auditor-General 2001). Nearly a 
decade later, an audit of SASSA highlighted similar documentary problems, noting 
deficiencies “including information technology controls in the SOCPEN system” and 
“poor filing management” (Hlongwa 2010).  
Although it is not traditional to consider inanimate paperwork an influential 
mediator, a growing amount of scholarship has emphasized the vitality of mundane
artifacts (e.g. Latour 1992; Bennett 2010). As Matthew Hull (2012: 13) writes, “Just as 
discourse has long been recognized as a dense mediator between subjects and the world, 
we need to see graphic artifacts not as neutral purveyors of discourse, but as mediators 
that shape the significance of the linguistic signs inscribed on them.” For post-apartheid 
welfare, the documentary-mediation of state and citizen has often been a source of 
discretion and error, undermining the aspirations to fixed objectivity pinned upon them. 
This gap between standardized policy and discretionary practice was, in part, the
impetus for the basic income grant movement in the early part of the 2000s. In the
reasoning of those supporters, a universal grant would reduce the room for idiosyncratic 
discrimination, intentional or otherwise (RSA 2002; Goldblatt et al. 2006). However, a 
universal grant has proven politically infeasible, so reforms have sought to remove the
imperfections of the staff through a joint process of standardization and objectification. 
Some of this has been through standardizing the conduct of staff through training, and 











of the century, incidences of bureaucratic error and discretion are still common enough to 
be troubling.12 
Given the difficulty in standardizing human behavior, social grants have 
increasingly been reliant on technologies deemed impartial and objective. In South 
Africa’s pursuit of objectivity against corruption, fraud, and error, biometric identification 
is the cornerstone. The technopolitics of standardization and objectivity drive the 
adoption of biometrics as a way to reduce human discretion and boost bureaucratic 
efficiency. As Breckenridge (2005b: 281; emphasis added) writes,  
“The combination of digital scanning and networked information 
radically alters the characteristics of bureaucratic forms, removing them 
from the world of paper-based documents, and – more importantly – from 
the domain of human agency… The economic and administrative benefits 
that follow from this removal of the ‘human decision-maker’ are ineluctably 
moving the South African state towards networked and computerized 
biometrics as the core practice of the state.” 
 
This goal continues, and in its recent outline of work for 2012-2015, SASSA emphasizes 
that “The automation of systems for improved service delivery is non-negotiable… The 
constant use of manual systems not only limits the number of applications that can be 
processed in a day, but also contributes significantly to fraud and corruption in the grants 
administration system” (SASSA 2013). 
South	  African	  Biometric	  Welfare	  
The 2012 contract and re-registration into a centralized biometric payment database is 
the result of both the longer genealogy traced in the previous chapters and a more 
immediate biometric history. Since the early discussions of creating SASSA, the diversity 
of payment methods has been a source of tension: on the one hand, convenience and 
choice for beneficiaries is a recognizable benefit, but on the other hand, the splintered 
payment practices are the source of troubles for the government. As early as 2003, the 
Chief Director of Grant Systems and Administration for DSD, Selwyn Jehoma, told 
Parliament that the proposed SASSA “would not have nine different contractual 
arrangements across all the provinces” (Jehoma 2003b). In 2007, shortly after its 
formation, SASSA tried to standardize payment and identification infrastructure through 
                                                
12 Interviews with informants #1 & #3 members of civil society (October 2012), and #6, a 











a tender whose intent was “to ensure that service providers appointed in the nine 
provinces provided a standardized payment service in line with the norms of service 
delivery approved by government” (SASSA 2007). It was ultimately (and begrudgingly) 
cancelled because no such regularity was deemed possible from the bids received. As the 
adjudication committee wrote, the bids did not offer “standardized payment services,” 
appropriate norms and standards of security and integrity, nor were they cost-effective 
(Arendse 2008). The 2012 contract was the second effort following this failure. 
In the interim, SASSA has been working with an inherited system from the
provinces where many (though not all) grant recipients are biometrically identified. Recall 
that many provinces began adopting biometric identification systems for grant recipients 
during the 1990s. These biometric providers used different standards that did not
interoperate with each other or the national identification database, creating the risk of 
duplicate recipients (CRSS 1996). Then, as now, “[t]he fingerprinting technology tender 
was presented as the only possible solution to all these problems” (Cameron and Brand 
2006: 57). These systems were, in some cases, troubled from the start: in at least some
provinces, the contracts were marred by corruption. Technically, they often failed to 
function as promised: age, manual labor, or even cold weather could foul the scanners
(Breckenridge 2005).  
Furthermore, for these technical reasons and contractual clauses, SASSA has not
had ownership of a unified biometric database for 
recipients.13 The system that resulted from the
amalgamation of provincial databases, SOCPEN, has 
been routinely criticized for being out of date, filled with 
inaccuracies, and open to fraud (FinMark 2012b). Where 
fingerprint verification did occur, it was not always 
reliable, such as the case in 1999 when one town was 
found to be home to 1,650 identical fingerprints (Saloojee 
1999). In cases where SASSA was able to interoperate 
with other government databases, though, it has offered 
more success: in 2006, they revealed the results of comparing the database of public 






Western Cape 1,391 
Free State 1,825
Eastern Cape 6,518
Northern Cape 840 
Total 43,705 
Table 1. A 2006 investigation found 
43,705 government employees who 
were receiving social grants; only 












servants to those of grant recipients (see Table I). And while nearly half of those identified 
were entitled to the grant, 21,588 were considered fraudulent and removed (Hofmeyr 
2006).  
 SASSA has also been forced to move forward with its own biometric identification 
system due to the weaknesses of the national identity infrastructure. As Breckenridge 
(2008) has documented, the Home Affairs National Identification System (HANIS) is a 
long-running and still incomplete effort to standardize biometric identification 
technologies and databases for the country. Stakeholders have often suggested it would 
prove to be an apt solution for social grants. The Public Service Commission (1998) 
recommended it, though recognized it may not be available for some years. During the 
debates around the proposed basic income grant, proponents recognized the need to 
build the delivery infrastructure, and imagined HANIS being a key component of that.14 
The Taylor Committee (RSA 2002) recommended a phased introduction of the basic 
income grant, emphasizing that “to avoid any duplication of payment, a reliable 
identification and verification system will have to be established.” In 2003, the Basic 
Income Grant Coalition proposed to Parliament that “This ‘smart card’ based 
identification system is expected to offer the most cost-effective platform for the future 
administration and delivery of social grants” (BIG Coalition 2003). 
HANIS has its roots in national security concerns during the 1980s, but as the 
conflicts of that decade diminished, the program was quickly enrolled in other goals, 
notably the expanding welfare programs.15 Spurred by the ANC’s Reconstruction and 
Development Program, the Department of Home Affairs issued an R800 million tender 
for an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS), biometrically-enabled identity 
cards, and integration with the population register. However, the scope and cost of the 
project quickly mutated and expanded: smart cards replaced bar-coded ones; the budget 
for the smart cards alone ballooned to R1 billion; and an effort to have the cards support 
myriad government and commercial purposes commenced (Breckenridge 2008: 42-45).16 
                                                
14 De Wispelaere and Stirton (2012) make important points about the administrative difficulty of a 
universal grant. 
15 Its roots in national security make HANIS typical of many surveillance projects (Dandeker 
1990). 












Although the government has collected more than 40 million fingerprint sets, as of 2008, 
it is estimated that as many as 4-5 million duplicates litter the database. In large part, the
project has been impeded by competing legacy systems that are not interoperable, despite
considerable effort at setting standards for biometric algorithms and financial 
infrastructures. As one scholar of the Department of Home Affairs wrote, “HANIS has 
been in the Home Affairs pipeline for a number of years and seems always to be just a 
year or two from implementation” (Hoag 2010). As of December 2012, the Home Affairs 
Minister was still promising to roll out smart card identity documents (SAPA 2012). 
Unable to rely on the presence of HANIS cards, SASSA has moved forward with its own 
system.
More recently, biometrics have also been turned inward as an effort to remove the
opportunity for bureaucratic misbehavior. As SASSA reported to Parliament in March 
2010 when justifying their budget, “[s]taff were more strictly controlled through 
biometric access systems and clearer controls” that recorded employee activity to search 
for fraud and “ensure that these staff could not easily access sensitive programs where
they could manipulate information or create “ghost beneficiaries” in the system” (Pakade
2010). This is part of a broader effort to automate grant delivery, removing unskilled or 
corrupt bureaucrats.17 For example, the acting CEO of SASSA illustrated the biometric 
imaginary’s conception of biometrics in an early 2011 complaint that “The lack of 
automated business processes make activities extremely labour-intensive and error-prone” 
(Ensor 2011). Later that year, the head of SASSA’s internal audit and fraud management
unit highlighted automation as a means of overcoming “poor employee work ethic” 
(Sibanyoni 2011). Moving to electronic systems also saves money, and the acting CEO of 
SASSA noted during a time of financial limitations that automation also helped lower 
their “second largest portion of the budget”, personnel (Pakade 2010). 
The continuing salience of these twin goals is clearly evident in the issuance of the 
new grant payment contract in early 2012 to Net1 CPS, a South African technology firm. 
The government’s RFP called for “significantly improved services” with “sameness of 
17 The classic reference on automation, surveillance, and labor is Zuboff (1988); Magnet (2011) 
discusses the link between biometric adoption and labor control. 
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Beneficiary experience.”18 It sought a solution to “increase the commonality of [the] 
payment distribution platform…” “The minimum acceptable requirement,” they said, “is 
that all ten finger prints of Beneficiaries must be captured. The Biometric Data capturing 
during enrolment will be used for matching and authenticating during payment process.” 
In addition to requiring this data from grant recipients, beneficiaries – such as children – 
would also be incorporated. The goal, it explained, was to “enable the life certification 
process” and ensure “that a Beneficiary is not enrolled more than once” (SASSA 2011). 
In contrast, in the existing system, the millions of recipients who received grants through 
electronic transfer to bank accounts only needed to provide a PIN to be paid (see Figure 
I). The ability to transfer a PIN to another person (unlike a fingerprint) created the 
possibility of the grants being received by undeserving individuals.  
 The award in early 2012 of the R10 billion contract for the entire country to Net1 
CPS prompted an acrimonious court challenge by a losing bidder, AllPay.19 As a 
subsidiary of ABSA bank, AllPay was the incumbent payment provider in the Western 
Cape, Free State, Gauteng and parts of the Eastern Cape, while Net1 CPS operated in 
                                                
18 All government document quotations are sic, including the peculiar capitalization.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of Beneficiaries by Payment Method and Province (Source: FinMark 2012b) 
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the other provinces (except Mpumalanga, where a third firm—Epilweni—was used). 
AllPay alleged improprieties in the tendering and the allegations were quickly supported 
by subsequent media reports that suggested the influence of bribery (e.g. McKune 2012a). 
These assertions that have led authorities in both South Africa and America (where Net1 
is listed on the stock exchange) to investigate, but as of May 2013, no updates were 
available. 
In their court filings responding to AllPay’s complaint, SASSA made clear the 
importance of standardization and biometric authentication, including an extended 
explanation at the beginning about the difficulties they sought to overcome with the new 
tender: 
“Prior to the coming into operation of SASSA in April 2006, the 
administration of social assistance was assigned to the Provincial 
Departments of Social Development. This assignment created 
numerous service delivery challenges… The administration of social 
grants at provincial level created a platform for abuse arising mainly 
from a lack of uniformity which in turn suppressed the opportunity for 
detection of such abuse. It was accordingly resolved that to deal with 
this difficulty, that a national approach be adopted in dealing with 
social grants in order to instil uniformity and standardization” 
(Ramokgopa 2012: 8-9). 
The filing also bemoans the “fragmented payment system” inherited from the provinces, 
split between multiple, incompatible contractors. For example, in the Eastern Cape, the 
SASSA representative explained, “There are five different service providers with six 
methodologies of payment. Whilst this is not the forum to demonstrate the difficulties this 
causes, I wish to allude to the fact that the six different methodologies employed in the 
Eastern Cape Province has directly led to substantial fraud and other abuses” 
(Ramokgopa 2012: 10). Many of these legacies were remnants of the 1990s, and because 
of the failed 2007 tender, SASSA has been unable to absolve itself of these commitment.  
In contrast to SASSA’s response, AllPay’s complaint depicted a different vision for 
the contract. “AllPay’s focus,” they asserted, “is to facilitate access to financial services 
and products to beneficiaries of social grants, with particular focus on the rural and semi-
urban communities” (Webb 2012: 22). Given the extensive network of ABSA bank 
branches and ATMs, AllPay maintained that they could provide formal financial services 
where Net1 could not (as a non-bank). An insistence on biometric identification for each 
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payment (instead of just registration), would render ATMs useless because they do not 
have fingerprint scanners. Thus, biometric verification, AllPay asserted, “undermines the 
Government’s stated policy of “banking the unbanked” and enabling beneficiaries to 
access their grants anywhere in the country and through any medium, including ATMs” 
(Webb 2012: 63). AllPay further pointed specifically to Net1 CPS’s proprietary standard 
which historically did not interoperate with the standard national payment system.  
 However, in contrast to AllPay’s belief that moving recipients into the banking 
system was the key goal, SASSA firmly asserted that “The key objective of the tender is to 
facilitate standardization of the payment process while eliminating fraud and duplication 
of payments by introducing proof of life (biometric) as a prerequisite for all payments.” It 
was, they explained, “part of SASSA’s ultimate plan for consolidation, centralization and 
ownership of payment data.” SASSA contended in court that AllPay “did not make 
provision for adequate biometric verification and standardization of services” and thus 
“fell short of requirements imposed by SASSA” (Ramokgopa 2012: 11). 
 Net1 CPS, in contrast, put biometric identification at the core of its offerings, and, 
as they gleefully revealed in their submissions to the court, their new offering has been 
able to combine their proprietary biometric payment technology with the standard 
national payment system (such as that used by bank cards and ATMs). Because the 
standard system would still not allow fingerprint verification, Net1 CPS would “conduct 
proof of life verification telephonically, as an alternative to fingerprint technology” 
(Belamant 2012: 14). This new form of voice biometric verification would be used in cases 
where recipients were receiving their grants into a bank account, requiring a brief 
monthly call to certify they had not deceased.  
 This seems to have caught AllPay by surprise. Not completely without merit, they 
had believed that fingerprinting was the biometric method de rigueur. It was not the case 
that AllPay was opposed to biometric identification – indeed, they spent considerable 
time detailing their technical acumen – but only after seeing their opening salvo in favor 
of “banking the unbanked” stall. It was a difference in emphases arising from technical 
and institutional legacies; while both would conduct fingerprint enrolment to remove 
duplicate entries, Net1 stressed an objective and standardized way to check identity each 
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month for all recipients. Net1 CPS stakes its work on universal biometrics; for AllPay, it 
has always been secondary to its banking and ATM system. 
In addition to the court filings, SASSA officials have validated the new system to 
the public. In response to an inquiry about fraud from Parliament, the CEO of SASSA 
called the new biometric scheme “the greatest risk reduction tool that SASSA had 
engaged in its history” (Peterson 2012b). Emphasizing the appeal of removing 
bureaucratic weakness, she has specifically highlighted “automation of business processes” 
(Peterson 2012a). Standardizing the system with other sectors was also a key benefit: “The 
gathered details of our beneficiaries will be checked against the population register in the 
Department of Home Affairs, the database of the South African Receiver of Revenue and 
that of the Government Employees Pensions Fund. We will work with the Departments 
of Home Affairs, Health, Basic Education, Defence, State Security and the South African 
Police Service” (Dlamini 2012). Speaking in March 2013, as the re-registration process 
was finishing, Social Development Minister Dlamini (2013) reported that nearly 19 
million recipients had been registered into the new system and that she was “pleased to 
report that 44 thousand social grants were manually lapsed at the request of the 
beneficiaries. A further 66 thousand grants lapsed due to non-collection. We shall 
continue to root out fraud and corruption whenever and wherever it appears to ensure 
that social grants only go to eligible beneficiaries.” She noted a further benefit was the 
ability to detect nearly 400 beneficiaries who were receiving their grants outside of South 
Africa (a revelation at least one Member of Parliament deemed “shocking”). Net1 CPS, 
too, has joined the chorus, projecting that it “will save the national government in excess 
of R2 billion to R4 billion per annum, as it will eliminate any duplication, any fraudulent 
claims ostensibly on behalf of deceased person, the claiming of multiple child benefits in 
regard to the same child (by the same or multiple recipients) and similar fraudulent 
practices” (Belamant 2012: 21). 
Conclusion	  
In many ways, the new grant infrastructure instituted in 2012 is the result of nearly two 
decades of reform efforts. The Chikane Committee’s call for biometrics to be addressed in 
a unified, national manner has been accomplished. In Minister Dlamini’s (2012) words, 
“The improved biometric-based payment solution was long overdue and will go a long 
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way towards minimising fraud and corruption so prevalent in the previous systems.” 
Whether it is effective, of course, remains to be seen, yet the adoption of the program 
follows similar logics that have motivated other aspects of the post-apartheid social grants 
scheme, including institutional centralization and the growth of quantified evidence. 
The approach of actor-network theory (ANT) seems particularly apt for this 
technopolitical initiative, merging, as it does, material and social actors. In particular, the 
task of the bureaucratic and policy elite can be understood as an effort to reduce the 
transformation in goals that Callon (1986) calls “translation” and ANT posits as a basic 
reality of action. Because action is always mediated, and mediators always serve to alter 
the goals – however sparingly – translation needs to be minimized to reliably “act at a 
distance” (Law 1986). In the case of SASSA, the task of distributing millions of rand per 
month has required creating a sociotechnical network that minimizes the capacity for 
intermediaries to serve as anything but passive infrastructure. In the words of the PSC 
(1998), the goal is that “policy and execution are not divorced.” In practice, this has 
spurred a growth of automated technologies like biometrics that enhance the power of the 
center by reducing the leeway of mediating actors. As Daston and Galison (1992) note, 
“Instead of freedom of will, machines offer… freedom from will.” Biometric 
identification, then, is to serve as a means of audit, which Rose (1999: 155) deems a “key 
fidelity technique” for holding others to account.  
Following Busch (2011: 68), biometric “standards are a means by which we 
construct objective reality.” But if the literature on audit (e.g. Power 1997) is an indicator, 
there will need to be a social solution to the lack of trust, for ones based in technique alone 
“fail to immunize the assemblages they govern from doubt” (Rose 1999: 155). After all, 
already are reports emerging of biometric registration machines being stolen to generate 
false payment cards.20 The next chapter turns more extensively to the ways in which this 
technopolitical program may disappoint.  
20 Interview with informant #11, a member of government (April 2013). 
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VI. The	  Myth	  of	  Perfection	  &	  the	  Ambiguities	  of
Delegation
ABSTRACT: In the process of building the post-apartheid welfare state, 
biometric identification has been promulgated as a necessary and 
effective means of standardizing service delivery and removing undue 
discretion. This chapter addresses both the means and ends of the 
technopolitical programs I have outlined. First, I suggest that the 
various biometric failures should not be considered exceptions, but 
rather endemic to technological solutions, necessitating an adjustment 
in how biometrics are conceived in welfare programs. Secondly, I 
suggest that even when goals are, by-and-large, reached, there are 
inherent tensions in the trajectory of the centralized biometric welfare 
regime in South Africa, one that may distance the state from the citizen.  
Introduction	  
Throughout the sources of elite discourse discussed above runs a commitment to 
standardization and objectivity that has influenced the institutional forms, regimes of 
knowledge, and technological infrastructures of post-apartheid welfare. These animating 
attitudes have served to promote a particular understanding of biometric identification as 
a necessary, effective, and appropriate means of social grant administration, a collective 
belief I have called the biometric imaginary. In this final substantive chapter I would like 
to approach this more reflexively. I believe the consensus view of biometric welfare 
deserves skepticism, for both its means and ends are not as straightforward or uniformly 
beneficial as commonly held. As a means of individually identifying grant recipients, 
biometric identification has shortcomings that are not insignificant but nor are they fully 
addressed. Secondly, there are reasons to believe that the goals of standardization and 
objectivity are creating a regime that places too little emphasis on alternative values.  
The	  Myth	  of	  Perfection	  
The bureaucratic elite and their peers in civil society, the news media, and elsewhere 
have presented biometrics as a material means of improving service delivery, uniformly 
identifying recipients, and removing undesirable activity. Speaking of the new biometric 
grant program, Social Development Minister Dlamini (2012) unequivocally stated that it 
“will eliminate incidents of fraud and corruption in the social grants system” which she 
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said resulted from the “manual system that SASSA has been using.” SASSA’s chief, 
Virginia Peterson (2012c), claimed “the new SASSA card… will make it virtually 
impossible for fraudsters to defraud the Agency.” 
The appeal of biometric identification rests on its presumed uniqueness and 
universality, its ability to labor reliably free of error. This is especially so when compared 
to other methods of identifying recipients. For example, forged identity documents have 
been said to undermine the accuracy of the grant database (e.g. Saloojee 1998). PIN-
based means of authenticating identity for payment have also been sidelined, with Net1 
CPS denigrating them as “simply not user-friendly and safe enough to safeguard the 
funds to the poorest of the poor” (Belamant 2012: 34). PIN-based cards are also 
condemned because of worries that moneylenders will confiscate cards and demand PINs 
from grant recipients as a means of debt repayment. The same portability of PINs also 
facilitates withdrawals on behalf of the deceased. Instead, biometric verification offers a 
means of uniquely identifying – with certitude – the payment recipients, and it can do so 
universally.  
Influential supporters of using biometric identification for cash transfers similarly 
conceive of the method as accurate and free from the difficulties associated with other 
forms of identification. The World Bank asserts that “Biometric identification can 
overcome traditional difficulties in identifying beneficiaries without appropriate 
documentation” (Garcia and Moore 2012: 7).21  Proponents of radically expanding the 
social grants suggest that biometrics would allow “for the virtual elimination of fraud” 
and that “illiteracy would not be a barrier to the mass roll-out of such a system” 
(Coleman 2003: 124). The Center for Global Development, too, has supported 
biometrics, arguing that the “barriers to cash-transfers are no longer technical, but 
political” (Gelb and Clark 2011); for them, the technology offers a “revolution” and 
opportunity to “leapfrog development” (Gelb and Clark 2013). This sort of “rupture-talk” 
(Hecht 2002) is widespread in the development industry and offers the possibility of 
radically accelerated progress while occluding the history of failure that comes from both 
the technological weakness and social intransigence.  
21 In the case of South Africa, this is not true: documentary identification is still required for 
enrolment in the biometric system. 
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In the case of biometrics, it builds on the presumption of universal accuracy – 
everyone has fingers! – and algorithmic objectivity. This understanding of biometrics is 
not unique to South Africa; as Magnet (2011: 2) has detailed, it is fundamental to 
biometrics: “Biometric science presupposes the human body to be a stable, unchanging 
repository of personal information from which we can collect data about identity.” 
Biometrics are thought to be “particularly useful because they are to replace human 
subjectivity with ‘mechanical objectivity’” (83). In contrast, Magnet argues that biometric 
technology is prone to failure, not as an aberration or exception, but rather that 
“biometric errors are endemic.” The experience in South Africa adds to this thesis, 
suggesting the faith in biometrics is at least partly mistaken, that they are unable to 
remove the unevenness of experience for which they are adopted. 
The confusion arises from a simplistic, overly technocratic understanding of the 
real-world implementation. The biometric imaginary is often misled by focusing too 
closely on the technical means through which individuals are identified by the state, 
rather than understanding the larger complexities of such an unwieldy task. As J.D. Peters 
(2001: 9) elaborates, it is a familiar error, a belief that communications technologies will 
solve failures to communicate; it is, he writes, a “mistake to think that… better wiring will 
eliminate the ghosts.” Yet, the extraordinary investment in the infrastructure of 
identification is more often focused on the “wiring” rather than the soft, social minutiae of 
bureaucratic functioning. Even the otherwise thoughtful Chikane Committee fell prey to 
defining problems and solutions in terms of technological systems, arguing that the 
“principle cause… [of] serious and widespread” fraud and corruption “is the lack of 
proper systems of internal control”. Such as view ignores the role that poverty, inequality, 
and limited opportunity have in generating fraud. Instead, it focuses particularly on 
reforming systems of surveillance and audit. Biometrics, here, become another technical 
solution to social problems (cf. Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). 
As Breckenridge (2005a) relates, this dynamic has a lengthy pedigree in South 
Africa. Time and again, what he calls “the panoptic fantasy” motivated an enormous 
effort to accurately register and identify the population. Under Verwoerd, the Native 
Affairs Department undertook a massive fingerprinting exercise to replace the paper-
based archive, but, in the process, greatly overestimated the potential of the method. This 
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continues in the post-apartheid era. As he writes, “Computerised biometrics, like its 
paper-based predecessors, is driven by the fantasy of administrative panopticism – the 
urgent desire to complete and centralize the state’s knowledge of its citizens” 
(Breckenridge 2005b: 271)22 
The panoptic fantasy and the pursuit of objectivity are myths of perfection in 
contemporary South Africa, as well. Prior efforts to solve delivery problems through 
biometrics have ignored the embodied practices through which biometrics are enacted 
(cf. Suchman 1987). For example, long lines on payday mean recipients stand out in the 
cold for hours, often before sunrise, and the scanners tend to be ill-suited for such frigid 
fingers (Mabeta 2003). At the time, CPS was reportedly “reluctant to invest in new 
fingerprint technology that would sort out this problem” so instead a street-level 
bureaucrat had to manually override the fingerprint requirement, opening the door to 
street-level corruption. This sort of local discretion is precisely what biometric 
standardization has fought against: for example, during the 1990s, the employees of 
CPS’s precursor, Aplitec, “selected the best fingerprint impressions on a case-by-case 
basis” meaning that it was difficult to search for duplicates in a database – one person 
may be enrolled multiple times under different fingers. Furthermore, fingerprints 
captured during previous biometric social grant systems tend to be of poor quality, and 
even “a simple cut can make a finger unreadable, and it is common for grant-holders to 
actually lose the finger that was originally chosen to secure the payment card” 
(Breckenridge 2005b: 274). 
Similar problems have emerged during the 2012-2013 registration initiative. For 
example, the children who were required to be enrolled were often fearful of the red light 
emitting from the fingerprint scanner, protesting and crying as they mistakenly thought 
they would be burned.23 Early results from the use of the voice recognition system, too, 
suggest technical difficulties, including poor recording environments during re-
22 Critics and detractors, too, often fall prey to this panoptic fantasy (perhaps starting with 
Foucault). For example, Edwards and Hecht (2010) note that anti-apartheid activists 
“exaggerated the police computer capabilities, but not their goals.” Contemporary critical 
scholars similarly find justification for their worries in the belief that biometrics represent flawless 
means of surveillance, such as van der Ploeg (2002: 60; emphasis added) who says that biometrics 
are “rapidly growing in importance as a tool to perfect a far wider range of social categorizations, 
including, for instance, welfare recipients, refugees, and migrants.”  
23 Interview with informant #6, a current member of government (November 2012).  
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registration (Kweyama 2013). This is a sort of ‘friction’ that, as Edwards (2010: 97) notes, 
“generates errors and noise.” It is also indicative of Burrell’s (2012) assessment that many 
digital technologies now proliferating in sub-Saharan Africa are poorly designed for the 
“invisible users” who are not considered in the process of invention. 
A more significant failure of the biometric technology is the portion of the 
population that has been unable to enroll, especially domestic laborers whose fingerprints 
are eroded from years of washing dishes. Additional worries exist for farm and mine 
laborers, many of whom have lost fingerprints or even whole fingers and hands. Because 
biometric identification is compulsory in the new system, these populations will require a 
procurator, an individual who will enroll and withdraw money on their behalf. Of the 
figures available, in October 2012, with only 15 percent of the recipients re-registered, 
13,000 procurators had been required (SASSA 2012). Perhaps ironically, this creates a 
form of dependency that, at the very least, will introduce complicated negotiations and 
conflicts for the individuals. More fundamentally, it unsettles the stated goal of “sameness 
of Beneficiary experience” (SASSA 2011). Critical studies of biometric identification have 
previously highlighted this disjuncture between the presumed (and marketed) universality 
of biometrics and the diverse reality of bodily features; in particular, scholars like Magnet 
(2011) have emphasized that the persistent failures of biometric technology represent 
gender and class distinctions: while fingers typical of white collar labor are rarely 
problematic, for low-income populations doing manual labor, this is not the case.  
There is a classic tension active here. On the one hand, standards are trying to be 
set centrally, rectifying the inequality of access arising from the apartheid era. On the 
other hand, the inestimable complexity of the world can rarely be classified, sorted, and 
homogenized without considerable difficulty (Busch 2011; Bowker and Star 2000). One of 
the dangers of the biometric imaginary is that this tension is subsumed by the pressing 
desire to improve the welfare state. General consensus can obscure subtle ethical and 
political implications, and this broadly-sensed urgency is certainly also involved in the 
near total absence of privacy or data protection discussions. 
This history of biometric failure and the ongoing difficulties are rarely 
acknowledged. For all their mimetic aspirations, neither biometric technologies nor the 
dominant ways in which they are conceived accurately reflect reality. This lack of 
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correspondence is what makes the concept of the biometric imaginary particularly apt in 
this case. An imaginary is not a fantasy – it is grounded in reality and is actually 
productive – but at the same time, it may be decoupled from certain on-the-ground 
realities as the consensus blurs certain distinctions. The overwhelming focus on 
standardization and objectivity are, in my view, key reasons for this indifference. But the 
durability of the biometric imaginary is also a result of its successes, and it would be a 
mistake to ignore the subtle ways in which success and failure are intertwined.  
Like other technopolitical efforts, biometric identification can be a productive 
failure (Edwards and Hecht 2010; Edwards 1996: 75-112). The promises embedded in 
the technology – such as ending corruption – need not be fully realized in order to justify 
the expense and effort of biometrics. This interpretive flexibility enables a wider range of 
support for biometric identification, fueling the biometric imaginary. Because biometric 
technology is presumed to be effective it can serve certain needs. 
This was clear when Minister Dlamini (2013) was “pleased to report” in March 
2013 that the biometric re-registration process had resulted in 44 thousand grants being 
cancelled and 66 thousand lapsing due to non-collection. This was represented – both in 
her speech and the subsequent news reports – as a successful example of using biometric 
identification to, as she put it, “root out fraud and corruption whenever and wherever it 
appears to ensure that social grants only go to eligible beneficiaries.” As a percent of 
beneficiaries (less than half a percent) this is quite small, but that does not seem to register. 
An important fact is that welfare surveillance and auditing in the form of biometric 
identification did not need to prove technically efficacious in order to produce its effects 
here. These individuals were not caught, but rather preemptively canceled or let lapse 
their grants. Even if all the lapsed grants were fraudulent (an heroic assumption given 
widespread beneficiary confusion and frequent normal turnover), it was not the promised 
de-duplication or identity verification that was responsible. It was the perception that the 
technology functions which produced its result. The authoritative presentation of 
biometric technology as effective is performative (cf. Austin 1975); rupture-talk helps to 
create the desired disjuncture.24 A bit more speculatively, one can imagine that the 
24 On this phenomenon in surveillance see Bogard (1996) and Gates (2011).Joseph Masco (2002: 
460) has noted a similar result in his ethnography of nuclear scientists operating in a context of
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presentation of such anti-corruption efforts – especially ones utilizing innovative and not 
particularly well-understood technology – performs a different reality to another 
audience: it demonstrates a particular seriousness about the ‘crisis’ in grant fraud and 
corruption on the part of DSD and SASSA.  
Finally, it is important to note another way in which biometrics ‘work’ even if they 
do not meet their promise of ending fraudulent access. In receiving the SASSA contract, 
Net1 CPS secured a large and lucrative market of around R2bn annually. Had they lost 
the contract, 50% of their business would have followed (Speckman 2012). Instead, they 
have revealed that they are currently in talks with 11 other countries, no doubt benefiting 
from the prestige and experience of this contract. Serving as payment provider for so 
many has also opened up ancillary markets, such as (controversially) offering financial 
services (McKune 2012a). For those who place credence in the corruption allegations 
(which they deny), the importance of this contract to the firm is taken as motive, but a 
more general point is also true: the fervent commitment to combating the ‘crisis’ with 
biometric identification – and not, say, identity documents – has boosted a nascent 
technology without many other markets.  
Delegation,	  Standardization,	  and	  the	  State-­‐Citizen	  Relationship	  
Despite this skepticism about the promise of biometric identification, the ambitions are 
not wholly mythical. Although the new system cannot live up to the goals of reliably 
identifying all grant beneficiaries let alone stopping fraud, it is not impotent, and the ends 
should be subject to critical analysis as well as the means. 
One such concern that is beginning to emerge is the role that biometric 
identification has in separating the state and citizen. One of the ways this occurs is 
through the heightened importance of expertise, often materially embodied in 
technology.25 The effort to end private exploitation of public monies has led to a situation 
where discretion has increasingly been delegated to digital technologies, chief among 
them biometric scanners and databases. “Delegation”, refers to the interchangeability of 
“hypersecurity” – as with the nuclear bomb, technologies like lie detectors work because they are 
perceived to work. They “offer the illusion of a high-tech answer to the problem of the social but 
ultimately fall back on brute intimidation as the means to an end.” Masco (2002: 462) asserts that 
this culture of suspicion compromises “the very scientific institutions they are intended to secure”, 
and the literature on welfare surveillance in the global North suggests the same. 
25 On this, generally, see Mitchell (2002).  
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human and technical labor, a practice rich with moral implications, such as when part of 
the task of safe driving is delegated away from autonomous selves to the concrete speed 
bump (see Akrich and Latour 1992). As Ribes et al. (2013) put it, “delegation to 
technology sinks organizational work into infrastructure” meaning that human autonomy 
is often curtailed (in this case, quite purposefully). 
In the case of South Africa, delegation has primarily been twofold, (a) away from 
little-scrutinized and poorly-verified grant applications and toward interoperable 
databases to remove those deemed underserving and (b) away from street-level 
bureaucrats and toward biometric cash dispensers. This transformation is widely 
considered ethically legitimate, a technical means of enforcing rules, but in neither case is 
it an unalloyed good.  
On the topic of (a) enforcing application regulations, the emphasis on technologies 
of surveillance and audit serves to constrict what Scott (1992) calls “infrapolitics”, the 
everyday weapons of the weak such as grant ‘fraud’.  Many poor South Africans share 
details on how to pass the means test and qualify for a grant (Versfeld 2012). In a 
situation of rampant and durable unemployment, much of it caused by decades of racial 
authoritarianism, there is a case to be made that these tactics – while formally illegal – are 
a necessary livelihoods strategy.26 According to the Special Investigation Unit, one of the 
primary forms of grant “fraud” is “individuals who initially qualified to receive a grant, 
but then saw an improvement in their financial status which generally disqualifies them 
from receiving grants” (Timm 2012). Formally, these people are required to notify 
SASSA of their changed situation. However, income generation by the poor is highly 
fluid, fluctuating widely over the course of months (Collins et al. 2010). The simplistic, 
binary means test is therefore unlikely to accurately capture the lived reality of poverty. 
This is, of course, exacerbated by the small amount of the grant, making other forms of 
income generation necessary. 
The continuing delegation to proprietary technological systems of audit and 
surveillance change this dynamic. The shift from human to device is not a straightforward 
26 Moreover, it seems odds that fraud and corruption should be so closely linked when, in reality, 
they are different activities, often operating in different moral registers: a poor individual acting 
even poorer to get some assistance does not seem the same as a salaried government employee 
falsifying invoices, yet ‘fraud and corruption’ are so tightly linked discursively that the distinction 
is rarely made. 
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translation, but rather a subtle transformation. Simplified technical systems allow for yes 
versus no answers, not complicated street-level negotiations. The biometric technologies 
are “black boxes” (Latour 1987), unavailable for public inspection, let alone human 
negotiation. Politics now requires getting inside the black box, something that is out of 
reach for nearly all South Africans. Objectivity is not neutral, and their conflation is 
deeply mistaken because the removal of subjective discretion is deeply biased towards 
those that control the technology.  
The second delegation, at the point of payment, also has subtle implications. The 
new system has sought to increase convenience by no longer requiring recipients to 
appear at a SASSA facility on a given day. By distributing the grant payments at myriad 
merchants the (laudable) hope is to reduce lines and travel. While 60 percent of 
beneficiaries used to receive their grant at pay points, as of April 2013, it had decreased to 
22 percent, with a significant shift toward retailers and ATMs (Dunkerley 2013). As the 
transition to the new system was finalized in early- to mid-2013, beneficiaries receiving 
payments at merchants or ATMs began to report technical problems, such as their card 
being ‘eaten’ by the ATM (e.g. Matlala 2013). In contrast to the traditional SASSA pay 
points, where a government employee was present, in the new system, beneficiaries now 
interact with a third-party merchant or faceless machine. In either case, beneficiaries had 
little recourse.27  
The irony is that the distance between citizen and state has been extended in an 
effort to remove discretionary middle-men between the fiscus and the pocket of the poor. 
As Ferguson (2013: 236) puts it, “one wonders if, for some, these technical advantages 
might not be offset by the ‘social’ attractions of a more familiar sort… where the socially 
‘thick’ recognition that comes from being looked after by a local party-state is after all 
preferable (for many) to the frighteningly ‘thin’ recognition of the iris scan – if only 
because it implies a humanly social (rather than technocratically asocial) bond between 
state and citizen.” In these ways, biometric welfare resembles what Callon et al. (2009) call 
‘delegative democracy’, the assignment of technopolitics to specialists, not the broader 
public. When something fails – as it did during a technical error in January 2013 where 
27 Interview with informant #10, a current government official (April 2013). 
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many pensioners in the Western Cape did not receive their full grant – the delegation 
means those on the ground are unable to address the errors.28 
These delegations and redistributions of power, in turn, raise the stakes elsewhere. 
The countless street-level negotiations, maneuvers, and deceptions that the biometric 
imaginary condemns as illicit fraud (rather than ambiguous infrapolitics) are minimized 
while the influence of the biometric policy and technical standards are enhanced.29 When 
the rise of biometric welfare administration is viewed as redistribution – rather than (as 
the biometric imaginary has it) an absolute reduction – of subjectivity, then it is less 
surprising why the current biometric contract between SASSA and Net1 CPS has been 
the subject of intense legal dispute and allegations of corruption. If true, it suggests that 
the effect of the biometric system has been to reduce petty corruption but increase grand 
corruption. Although SASSA and Net1 strenuously deny the allegations (and have gone 
forward with the contract) the episode is an illuminating suggestion that the reduction of 
subjectivity at the street-level increases the subjectivity at the center. The centralization 
also created a certain fragility, illustrated during the court case when a lower-court judge 
found the contract “illegal and invalid” (McKune 2012a) but refused to set it aside due to 
the disruption it would cause to the millions of grant beneficiaries.  
Indeed, the centralization of welfare decision-making in post-apartheid South 
Africa has created a situation of concentrated judgment about who qualifies for grants 
and who does not, both in policy and technical enactment. The opposition to street-level 
objectivity magnifies the influence of decisions made by SASSA. Infrastructural 
standardization, biometric identification, and quantitative reasoning have been 
fundamental techniques of this rationalization. As scholars of these phenomena have 
noted, they play an instrumental role in centralizing authority. Porter (1996: 51) writes 
that “Accounts and statistics, broadly speaking, are the lines connecting the world to what 
Latour calls ‘centres of calculation’”. In his history of fingerprinting, Cole (2002: 235) also 
notes biometrics ability to create centres of calculation (Latour 1987), bringing much of 
28 Interview with informant #4, a member of civil society focused on human rights (March 2013). 
29 This can be compared to other social sectors, such as healthcare. Vale (2012a; 2012b) has 
documented the improvisations necessary for community health workers to fulfill their duties, a 
street-level informality that is in conflict with official rules. A similar conflict is currently occurring 
with the qualifications for the disability grants, as more stringent rules exclude the needy. 
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the world into focus in one location. The digitization of this process allows it to occur 
effectively on an unprecedented scale. 
Given the pathetic state of social assistance delivery at the end of apartheid, it 
seems clear that some centralized uniformity was necessary (Geviser 2007: 716). Recall, at 
the time of the transition, there were more than a dozen agencies responsible for social 
policy and limited administrative capacity tended to affect most the neediest. SASSA has, 
in large part, improved upon these situations (PSC 2011). 
But has this process of bureaucratic rationalization gone too far, as Weber warned 
it might? Is South Africa’s “radically centralized” (Breckenridge 2008) bureaucracy an 
iron cage? Many believe so, particularly under the Mbeki presidency of 1999 to 2008 
(Terreblanche 2008). Mbeki was, in many ways, a classic technocrat, “with a devotion to 
technique rather than building relationships” (Friedman 2009).30 The Mbeki government 
operated under what Marais (2003) called “the logic of expediency”, under which there is 
“a tendency to regard subnational governments as purely technical agents of ‘delivery’ 
rather than spheres of representation” (Friedman 2009). Embedded in this imaginary is 
delivery as a one-way affair and a tendency to view ‘citizens’ as ‘customers’ (Hemson and 
O’Donovan 2005). Framing the government’s role in terms of ‘delivery’ makes success 
dependent upon efficiency, not “to determine citizens’ wishes and to secure their co-
operation but to recruit the best ‘delivery’ techniques and personnel” (Friedman 2009). In 
this highly modernist mindset, government-to-citizen interfaces can be a burden to be 
overcome (Friedman 1999; Marais 1997).  
The process may be exacerbated by the peculiarities of post-apartheid democracy. 
Elections are infrequent and limited to a vote for the national and a vote for the 
provincial party. Members of Parliament are chosen by party elite, not voters, meaning 
they have little to no incentive to learn about voter opinions. And, perhaps most 
significantly, the ANC retains a nearly two-thirds majority, which allows it “to ignore or 
even violate public preferences on a range of issues without seriously threatening its 
electoral prospects” (Mattes 2012: 19).  
30 I use the term technocrat without intending the negative association, but rather to denote a 
particular mode of governance dedicated to rationality, technique, and method.  
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Barchiesi (2011) has argued that ANC policymaking is often “insulated from 
political contestation and dominated by technocrats, experts and consultants” meaning 
that anti-welfare ideologies amongst elites can trump welfare proponents. This may be 
the case, including with the basic income grant, where even government elite admit that a 
different “philosophy” guides their opposition to the proposal (Meth 2004). But it is key to 
remember that, in large part, this centralization has been the result of political 
liberalization, an opening up that means no longer is poor administrative capacity free 
from the agitations and demands of the public. Instead, the trouble may be that the 
techniques through which this national equalization of standards for service delivery have 
been accomplished – standardization, quantification, and biometrics – have created a 
more subtle barrier, a “regime of perceptibility” (Hecht 2012: 173; Murphy 2006) that 
structures the production of official knowledge about poverty.  
I first sensed this during a heated exchange at the Carnegie III Conference on 
Strategies to Overcome Poverty & Inequality, held in September 2012. In the question 
and answer session following a presentation by the Department of Social Development of 
their quantitative impact assessment (the “gold standard” study discussed in chapter four), 
an incensed representative of a grassroots NGO berated the government official for not 
doing more. The questioner passionately disputed the positive picture painted by the 
state’s impact assessment, depicting, instead, the misery of poverty, the insufficiency of the 
grant, and the everyday troubles experienced trying to access it. She was joined by 
another audience member who lamented the continued exclusion of individuals who 
qualify for the grant due to administrative hurdles. A SASSA official in charge of the 
CSG (who happened to be in the audience) responded by detailing the myriad outreach 
efforts – from radio campaigns to canvassing rural geographies – as well as the 
administrative reforms implemented to overcome the exclusion. In remarkable candor, 
the exasperated official ask the audience what more could they do? They simply do not know 
how to find these excluded people! 
While the welfare officials are, of course, constrained by the political support for 
expanding the grants in scope or size, I believe a more fundamental tension is at play. It is 
not simply the practical difficulties of reaching 21 million beneficiaries in a country as 
large and geographically diverse as South Africa, though that certainly matters, too. 
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There seems to be an epistemological incongruence between the state and citizen. This 
became clear in another exchange I witnessed between SASSA officials and community 
leaders at a workshop hosted by a well-respected NGO. Here, too, SASSA officials found 
their national figures on grant uptake and impact to fall on deaf ears. The community 
leaders exhorted government to do more. The suffering they saw daily was visceral and 
embodied, ongoing and human. Their experience with it was unmediated, present in 
their own social worlds.  
The government officials, however, have a different task and therefore a different 
assemblage of instruments, data, infrastructures, and organizations that mediate their 
perceptions. As Talal Asad (1994) wrote in his comparison with ethnography, statistics 
“are the products not of experience but enumerative practices.” While some would be 
quick to condemn their synoptic view, I cannot help but feel more ambiguous about the 
whole technopolitical regime that produces it, for it seems to be closely tied to the 
founding principles upon which everyone seems to agree: post-apartheid social policy 
should be equitably and competently administered, in a manner that is impersonal and 
objective, free from the informal and formal discriminations of the previous era. While far 
from perfect, a contextualized and historical understanding of bureaucracy as “a positive 
extension of the repertoire of human possibilities” (du Gay 2000: x) might be appropriate 
in this case, even while recognizing that an extension of the repertoire of human 
possibilities comes with worrying downsides.  
Conclusion	  
Surveillance, Lyon (2007) points out, is always ambiguous. The devices and techniques of 
monitoring and auditing are ineluctably bound up with the particularities of a given 
context, meaning their effects are multiply determined. In the case of biometric 
identification, the post-apartheid context has yielded distinctions in the drivers, meaning, 
and implications of the technology. Biometric identification still serves to represent and 
reproduce “in visible, everyday forms” (Mitchell 1991: 81) ‘the state’, but it is doing so in 
what Ferguson (2011) has deemed a “left art of government.”  
Despite the generally progressive goals to which this technological apparatus is 
directed, as it co-constructs a social world, the complexity it confronts will not easily be 
shoehorned into its categories and assumptions; too firm of a commitment to certain 
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values such as standardization and objectivity will risk neglecting others, such as the 
necessary ad hoc negotiations of an engaged state or the ambiguity of ‘fraud.’ Imaginaries 
fade into the background, seeming to be common sense, and thus these transformations 
occur subtly, but this does not lessen their meaningfulness.  
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VII. Conclusion
The social grants are one of the flagship interventions of the new South Africa; at around 
3.5 percent of GDP and benefiting around 40 percent of the population, they are 
intimately involved in the formation of South Africa’s democratic identity, even if, in 
many ways, they are the product of the old South Africa. This importance and their scale 
make the social grants the subject of politically divisive debates, ranging from their 
affordability to their impact. Throughout these contests, though, runs a firm commitment 
to delivering grants reliably and equitably. The quality of implementation, therefore, is 
central to the broader politics of grants. This realm of implementation is one of civil 
servants and paperwork, statistical methodologies and accounting techniques. It is a 
complex interchange between the state and citizen that occurs millions of times each 
month. And it is a relationship to which biometric identification technology is pivotal. 
On one level, this dissertation has been an exploration of the salience of biometric 
technology within the social grants program. What explains the investment in 
identification infrastructure by the welfare bureaucracies? Why this method and not 
others? A colloquial answer would point to fraud and corruption, and while the 
widespread belief that the grants are the subject of exploitation and administrative 
incompetence has been a key motivating factor, this does not exhaust the particular 
reasons and manners through which it has unfolded. Instead, my argument traces a 
shared commitment – the biometric imaginary – that has grown during nearly twenty 
years of welfare implementation. The biometric imaginary positions biometric technology 
as a necessary, suitable, and effective means of achieving standardized and objective 
welfare administration. It is broader than just the purchase and use of fingerprint 
scanners; it builds upon programs of institutional reform, policymaking debates, and 
infrastructural development, but the implementation of a nationally centralized biometric 
identification scheme is perhaps its apogee, a technopolitical goal that has come together 
during the post-apartheid era as various forms of delivery weakness and fraud have 
bedeviled the initiative.  
As I have traced, the institution of a national biometric grant identification 
scheme in 2012 has a long lineage. Most directly it is the result of SASSA’s failed 2007 
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tender which was cancelled when no standardized option was deemed feasible. But the 
goal of a standardized and objective delivery mechanism is the result of a longer history, 
extending to at least the democratic transition where the inheritance of a fragmented 
bureaucracy curtailed the ability of the state to use its redistributive function to alleviate 
poverty. Since the mid-1990s, this fragmentation has been blamed for weak service 
delivery and widespread fraud and corruption. Unification through a process of 
centralized standards setting has been the order of the day, necessitating institutional 
reorganization, regulatory alignment, and infrastructural interoperability. That the 
biometric database has been explicitly designed as a nationally centralized system is not 
an accident, but rather the result of nearly two decades of broader reform and 
commitment. One could readily imagine alternative models – such as the provincial 
biometric schemes adopted during the 1990s – but the lack of interoperability with other 
provinces and the attendant sub-national differences in service delivery have proven to be 
at odds with the egalitarian ethos of the era. 
One could also imagine alternative methods of identification, such as the paper 
identity books and PIN-based authentication. And at various times, these and other 
alternatives have been proposed – after all, imaginaries are not totalizing nor uniformly 
applicable – but the promise of a unique and universally valid identifier that would 
operate free from human temptation has attracted the bureaucratic and policy elite. For 
the government, biometric identification represents an automated – and thus impersonal 
– means of identification, a way to end illicit behavior while paying grants uniformly.
As I have argued, these commitments to standardization and objectivity are 
deeply held, influencing welfare policy and practice beyond just biometric identification. 





1. A member of civil society focused on social security law (October 2012).
2. A member of government working on social security (September 2012).
3. A member of civil society focused on human rights (October 2012).
4. A member of civil society focused on human rights (March 2013).
5. A member of civil society focused on financial services (October 2012).
6. A member of government focused on social security (November 2012).
7. A member of civil society focused on financial services (November 2012).
8. A member of government focused on consumer rights (November 2012).
9. A former government social security stakeholder (April 2013).
10. A member of government (April 2013).
11. A member of government (April 2013).
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